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Relief from Federal Judgments: A
Morass Unrelieved by a Rule
By MARY KAY KANE*
Equity isA Roguish thing, for Law wee have a measure know what
to trust too. Equity is according to y conscience of him X is chancel-
lo , and as Y is larger or narrower soe is equity Tis all one as if they
should make ye Standardforye measure wee callA foot, to bery Chan-
cellors foot; what an uncertain measure would this be; One Chancellor
ha's a long foot another A short foot a third an indfferent foot; tisye
same thing in y Chancellors Conscience.... 1
The problem of when to allow relief from a civil judgment after
the time for an appeal has run is one that has plagued courts and
rulemakers since the beginning of court systems.2 The ageless quality
of this issue is not surprising because it demands the delicate balancing
of two often opposing principles:3 that there should be an end to every
piece of litigation,4 and that the primary aim of the judicial system
should be to find truth and to render justice to the deserving claimant.
Typically, American courts have placed finality before truth in the hi-
erarchy of values.5 As stated by Justice Story: "[I]t is for the public
* B.A., 1968, J.D., 1971, University of Michigan. Associate Professor of Law, Has-
tings College of the Law.
1. TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDON 43 (F. Pollock ed. 1927).
2. An early English statute dealing with judgments provided that any judgment en-
tered from the assizes should in no way be amended or altered. 2 Henry IV, c. 3 (1409).
Provision for some relief was made in later centuries through the use of various writs. The
issue whether relief was warranted in a given case, however, remained an important and
difficult one. See, e.g., Cannan v. Reynolds, 119 Eng. Rep. 493 (K.B. 1855). See generally
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *407.
3. For a more detailed discussion of these dual aims, see text accompanying notes
134-43 infra.
4. See generally Ocean Ins. Co. v. Fields, 18 F. Cas. 532, 539 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
(No. 10,406).
5. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.1, at 527-29 (2d ed. 1977). A
good example of this preference is the continued expansion of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, which establish the scope of the binding effect of a judgment. The American Law
Institute has proposed a transactional test of a claim for purposes of merger and bar, rather
than the narrower, historic cause of action test. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 61, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978). At the same time the doctrine of mutual-
ity, which acted as a significant limitation on the invocation of collateral estoppel, largely
has been abandoned. See Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal.
2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Currie, CiviiProcedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV.
25, 38-46 (1965).
interest and policy to make an end to litigation. . .[so that] suits may
not be immortal, while men are mortal."6 Despite this American pref-
erence, there has been a concomitant recognition that some exceptions
to the finality principle must exist.
Since 19487 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have provided
four principal methods by which litigants may attempt to reopen final
judgments in the federal courts. These methods are set out in Rule
60(b). s In brief, the rule permits an independent action, 9 the utiliza-
tion of existing statutory procedures,' 0 an application to set aside a
judgment for fraud through use of the inherent equity powers of the
court," and a motion under the rule itself based upon any one of the
sixteen grounds listed therein. 12
6. Ocean Ins. Co. v. Fields, 18 F. Cas. 532, 539 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 10,406).
7. Prior to 1948, the federal rule provided specifically for relief for mistake, inadver-
tence, surprise, and excusable neglect and also allowed relief to be sought under the princi-
ples of the old ancillary common-law and equitable remedies. See generally 7 MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE T 60.10 (2d ed. 1975). The rule was amended in 1948 to better clarify
when relief was appropriate. See Note, History and Interpretation of Federal Rule 60(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 77 (1951); Note, Federal Rule 60(b):
Relieffrom Civil Judgments, 61 YALE L.J. 76 (1952).
8. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) provides for the correction of clerical errors
in the judgment. Although such a correction may relieve a party from an erroneous judg-
ment, this procedure does not require the judgment to be reopened or the case to be retried
as is true under subdivision (b). It involves only a clerical change and, thus, has not posed
the same difficulties that have arisen under the latter provision. See generally 11 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2854-2855 (1973) [herein-
after cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
9. See generally II WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 2868; Note, Attacking Fraudu-
lently Obtained Judgments in the Federal Courts, 48 IOWA L. REV. 398 (1963).
10. See generaly 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.35 (2d ed. 1975).
11. See generaly 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.33 (2d ed. 1975); 11 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 8, § 2870.
12. "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresenta-
tion, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and
(3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action
to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not
actually personally notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C. § 1655, or to set aside a judgment
for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of
review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for ob-
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Most of the grounds for relief listed in Rule 60(b) codify well-rec-
ognized and concrete exceptions to the finality principle, formulated to
permit relief in situations in which the desire for truth is deemed to
outweigh the value of finality. For example, mistake and neglect,
listed in clause (1) as grounds for reopening judgments, were embodied
in the original rule13 and can be traced to prerule practice.14 Clauses
(2) and (3) simplify the relief procedure that previously existed, because
the grounds listed, newly discovered evidence and fraud, were the bases
for obtaining relief through special writs15 and independent actions.' 6
In a case invoking any of these first three clauses of the rule, relief is
restricted further in that it must be sought within a year of the entry of
judgment. Clauses (4) and (5), referring to void and satisfied judg-
ments, also represent well-established grounds for equitable relief by
the courts.' 7 Motions under these clauses must be made "within a rea-
sonable time."
The most controversial provision, at least at the time of its adop-
tion, was clause (6), which permitted "any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment."18  Its adoption was consistent
with the general approach of the revisers to provide a rule that would
be all-inclusive. 19 However, its very vagueness appeared to give
boundless discretionary power to the trial courts. Fears spread that
finality and certainty would be lost because of the absence of exact time
limits on the courts' exercise of that power,20 discretion was limited
only by the "reasonable time" restriction. Viewed most critically, the
"any other reason" clause potentially destroyed any notion of finality,
and severely undercut the time limitations placed on invoking the other
grounds listed in the rule.2' It is not surprising, then, that the immedi-
taining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
independent action." FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
13. See note 7 supra.
14. See, eg., Kaw Valley Drainage Dist. v. Union Pac. R.R., 163 F. 836 (8th Cir. 1908);
Hall v. Chisholm, 117 F. 807 (6th Cir. 1902).
15. See Moore & Rogers, Federal Relie//rom Civil Judgments, 55 YALE L.J. 623, 659-
82 (1946); Orfield, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Civil Practice, 20 VA. L. REv. 423
(1934).
16. See F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 13.8 (2d ed. 1977); Moore &
Rogers, Federal Relie//from Civil Judgments, 55 YALE L.J. 623, 653-59 (1946).
17. See 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE J 60.25-.26 (2d ed. 1975).
18. FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b)(6).
19. See 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.18[8] (2d ed. 1975); Comment, Equitable
Power f a Federal Court to Vacate a Final Judgmentfor ' Iny Other Reason Justifying Re-
lie---Rule 60(b)(6), 33 Mo. L. REv. 427, 429 (1968).
20. See generally 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.27[3] (2d ed. 1975).
21. "[W]hatever the stated intent of the drafters of the 'any other reason' clause may be,
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ate reaction to the rule was mixed.22
Almost thirty years have passed since the debate began. In large
measure, the focus during that time has been on specific problems or
questions that have arisen under the rule. This Article, by means of an
overview, attempts to determine in fact and in principle how well the
rule has operated. This study has two different, but complementary,
concerns. First, the Article investigates the boundaries the courts have
placed on the ability of litigants to successfully invoke relief under
Rule 60(b)(6). 23 Second, this Article identifies particular problem ar-
eas.24 The problems currently faced by the courts suggest not only the
defects in the present rule, but also their probable causes.25 Thus, stat-
utory changes are suggested that will better enable the legal system to
balance the competing goals of truth and finality highlighted by the
relief-from-judgment situation.26
General Observations
The cases in which Rule 60(b)(6) has been invoked can be divided
roughly into five categories. The first three categories do not warrant
more than brief mention, as they do not aid in evaluating the signifi-
it is more reasonable to suppose it means other special reasons of such a nature that, al-
though the facts fit other subdivisions, they also compel the court to allow relief for equita-
ble reasons." Comment, Rule 60(b): Survey and Proposalfor General Reform, 60 CALIF. L.
REv. 531, 559 (1972).
22. It is interesting to compare the attitudes of some of the commentators to the
Supreme Court's attempt to limit the application of clause (6) to extraordinary circum-
stances. See text accompanying notes 55-67 infra. All seem to agree that there are some
problems under the existing formulation. While this leads at least one author to conclude
that an amendment is necessary, Note, Federal Rule 60(b). Reliefrom Civil Judgments, 61
YALE L.J. 76, 85-86 (1952), others appear to feel that the courts are capable of handling the
problems, e.g., Comment, Temporal Aspects of the Finality of Judgments- The Significance of
Federal Rule 60(b), 17 U. CHI. L. REv. 664, 674-75 (1950); Note, History and Interpretation
of Federal Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 77, 85 (1951).
This willingness to rely on the courts is not surprising, as most of the authors were looking at
practice under the rule when it still was in an embryonic state. In one article published 20
years after the amended rule had been adopted, however, the author's optimism seems quite
unwarranted. See Comment, Equitable Power of a Federal Court to Vacate a Final Judg-
ment for "Any Other Reason Justifying Relief--Rule 60(b)(6), 33 Mo. L. Rv. 427, 441
(1968).
23. See text accompanying notes 55-92, 104-12 infra.
24. See text accompanying notes 93-103, 113-29 infra.
25. Although this Article focuses on problems arising under the federal rule, the federal
experience may be viewed as a microcosm of the types of relief-from-judgment problems
that also arise in state courts. The federal experience may suggest solutions to state
problems, especially insofar as the cases illustrate the underlying reasons for seeking relief
from judgment. See text accompanying notes 144-83 infra.
26. See text accompanying notes 144-83 infra.
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cance or usefulness of this equitable provision. In the first, the courts
cite clause (6) even though relief is sought within a year of judgment
and on grounds clearly within one of the first three clauses of the rule,27
or relief is available under clauses (4) or (5) of the rule.2 8 In these
situations the courts seem to use the provision merely as further sup-
port for their decisions to grant relief, as one might add one more case
to a long and already authoritative string citation. Because the clause
has no independent significance, the courts do not attempt to explain
how it aids their analysis. The second category includes cases in which
the "other reason" clause has been invoked for the purpose of constru-
ing the other clauses of the rule,29 as well as cases involving motions for
relief from default judgments under Rule 55(c). 30 In these cases, the
27. See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Tool & Mach. Co. v. Tecon Corp., 371 F.2d 589 (10th
Cir. 1966); Naples v. Maxwell, 368 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 971
(1967); Erick Rios Bridoux v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 214 F.2d 207, 209 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1954);
Block v. Thousandfriend, 170 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1948); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Lawrenson, 34 F.R.D. 121 (D. Md.), affd, 334 F.2d 464 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 869
(1964); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Davenport, 95 F. Supp. 469 (S.D. Iowa 1951). This same
unexplained excess of authority has appeared in actions denying relief. See, e.g., Schepp v.
Langmade, 416 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1969); Federal Enterprises, Inc. v. Frank Allbritten Mo-
tors, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 109 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
These cases should not be confused with the situation in which clause (6) is used as an
additional reason for granting relief and the court explains its applicability, notwithstanding
that the party's motion may be granted under some other portion of the rule. See, e.g.,
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. MacGill, 551 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1977); Rooks v. American
Brass Co., 263 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1959); Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d
242, 246 (3d Cir. 1951); Caraway v. Sain, 23 F.R.D. 657, 660 (N.D. Fla. 1959).
28. See, e.g., Block v. Thousandfriend, 170 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1948); Grand Union
Equip. Co. v. Lippner, 167 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1948); Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13 (E.D.
Ark.), rev'd on the merits, 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.), aj/7'd, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); United States v.
Edell, 15 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Tobin v. Mills, 92 F. Supp. 728 (W.D.S.C. 1950).
The courts also have granted relief under clause (6) when the movant more properly
should have moved under Rule 59 but the motion is made before the time for appealing has
expired. See, e.g., Hand v. United States, 441 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1971); Chicago & E. Ill.
R.R. v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 261 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
29. See, e.g., Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 426 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1970); Naples v.
Maxwell, 368 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 971 (1967); Laguna Royalty
Co. v. Marsh, 350 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1965); Abramson v. Superintendence Co., 335 F.2d 645
(5th Cir. 1964); Kelly v. Greer, 334 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1964); Erick Rios Bridoux v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Diversified Utils. Sales, Inc. v. Monte Fusco
Excavating Contracting Co., 71 F.R.D. 661 (E.D. Pa. 1976); American Employers Ins. Co. v.
Sybil Realty, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. La. 1967); Schwartz v. Pattiz, 41 F.R.D. 456 (E.D.
Mo. 1967), afid, 386 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1968); Ellington v. Milne, 14 F.R.D. 241 (E.D.N.C.
1953); United States v. Williams, 109 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Ark. 1952). See also Lafferty v.
District of Columbia, 277 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (insanity proceedings). All of these
cases invoke Rule 60(b)(6) as a liberalizing influence. Interestingly, others invoke the ex-
traordinary-circumstances test to serve as an additional restraint on using the first five provi-
sions, although that test was developed solely to set standards in applying clause (6).
30. See, e.g., Stuski v. United States Lines, 31 F.R.D. 188 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
September 1978]
courts have noted that the presence of clause (6) with its broad lan-
guage indicates the rulemakers' desire31 that all of the provisions for
relief from judgments be construed and applied liberally in order to do
equity.32
The third category involves cases similar to those decisions invok-
ing the clause in the interests of liberal construction. In this category
the courts grant an otherwise timely Rule 60(b) motion under Rule
60(b)(6), noting that it is unnecessary to decide under which portion of
the rule the motion is proper as clause (6) would allow relief.33 The
courts thereby avoid potentially difficult questions of statutory con-
struction, using Rule 60(b)(6) instead as a general authorization to
grant relief.
In the fourth category, the courts are faced with a true conflict of
values because of the less rigid time restrictions applicable to motions
under clause (6). As noted earlier, invocation of the first three clauses
of Rule 60(b) is specifically limited to one year. Time restrictions also
confront the losing party at a trial in terms of the ability to obtain other
types of review. A party can obtain an amendment of the findings34 or
make a motion for a new trial3 5 only within ten days of judgment; an
appeal must be taken within thirty days of the judgment.36 In contrast,
the "reasonable time"37 constraint of Rule 60(b)(6) permits its use be-
yond these time limits. It should not be surprising, then, that the vast
majority of cases under the rule are attempts to avoid these other time
31. Inquiry into the intent of the rulemakers must rely heavily on the Advisory Com-
mittee Notes to the 1948 amendment which are inconclusive in this instance because the
committee did not specifically explore the purpose of clause (6). The most that can be said
from the notes is that the committee meant to simplify the procedure for obtaining relief and
to liberalize the practice somewhat by extending the time for moving from six months to one
year. See Advisory Committee Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, reprinted at 5 F.R.D. 436, 477-80 (1946).
32. See, e.g., Laguna Royalty Co. v. Marsh, 350 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1965).
33. See, e.g., In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974); Hand v. United States, 441 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1971); Patapoff
v. Vollstedt's Inc., 267 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1959); District of Columbia v. Stackhouse, 239 F.2d
62 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(b), 59(e).
35. FED. R. Cwy. P. 59(b).
36. FED. R. App. P. 4(a).
37. What constitutes a reasonable time cannot be considered in the abstract. Rather,
the amount of time between the judgment and the motion for relief typically is noted and
considered reasonable or unreasonable depending on factors such as the nature and equities
of the movant's case. See text accompanying notes 49-54 infra. Of course, in some circum-
stances so much time has passed that the court denies relief without much discussion, simply
noting the length of time involved. See, e.g., Zurini v. United States, 189 F.2d 722 (8th Cir.
1951) (15 years); United States v. Manos, 56 F.R.D. 655 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (12-1/2 years).
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limits. The courts uniformly have ruled that clause (6) must be
deemed exclusive of these other provisions and cannot be applied to
render them nugatory.38 However, the courts also have tried to give
some independent meaning to the "other reason" clause, or to explain
why a given case falls within it rather than any of the other review
provisions, so that the granting of relief is proper.
In order to allow relief in deserving cases without generally abro-
gating time restrictions, the courts have developed and applied what
will be called the "extraordinary circumstances" test.39 Examining the
cases applying this test is an excellent way to see how the rule has oper-
ated, as well as how the courts have attempted to balance the goals of
truth and finality. Moreover, examination of the typical situations in
which relief is sought permits some conclusions about why and when
relief might be proper.4°
The fifth and final category of cases are those in which the courts
actually have found, or tried to find, some "other" reason for granting
relief.4 ' These cases do not involve attempts to avoid otherwise ex-
isting time limitations. Rather, they present situations apparently not
covered by any other subsection of the rule, arguably just those situa-
tions for which clause (6) was created. Given thirty years experience
under Rule 60(b), and after considering these cases, some judgments
can be made about the usefulness of this catchall clause and the need
for it as an equitable outlet in its present form.
The next portion of this Article examines these last two categories
of cases, those involving "extraordinary circumstances" or an "other
reason." Because they present situations in which Rule 60(b)(6) has
been invoked and interpreted by the courts, a review of those cases will
facilitate an evaluation of how well clause (6) has worked in practice
and its impact on the availability of relief from federal judgments.
38. Cases stating this principle are legion. See, e.g., Klapprott v. United States, 335
U.S. 601, 613 (1949) (Rule 60(b)(1)); Carr v. District of Columbia, 543 F.2d 917, 926 n.72
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (Rule 60(b)(2)); Hodgson v. United Mine Workers, 473 F.2d 118 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (app. Rule 4(a)). But see United States v. Karahalias, 205 F.2d 331, 333 (2d Cir.
1953) ("[W]e read the subsection as giving the court a discretionary dispensing power over
the limitation imposed by the Rule itself on subsections (1), (2) and (3). .. ."); Petry v.
General Motors Corp., 62 F.R.D. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (Rule 60(b)(3)); Lapiczak v. Zaist, 54
F.RD. 546 (D. Vt. 1972) (Rule 59(b)).
39. See text accompanying notes 55-103 infra.
40. See text accompanying notes 144-83 infra.
41. See text accompanying notes 104-29 infra.
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The Findings
Before scrutinizing the tests or standards the courts have devel-
oped for granting and denying relief under Rule 60(b)(6), some words
of caution are necessary. The ability to generalize is hampered some-
what by the different settings or types of judgments involved and by
varying notions of finality and its importance in these different con-
texts. For example, relitigation is most often allowed in the case of
default judgments because of the preference for a judgment based on a
full adversarial exploration of the issues. 42 Judgments entered because
of a failure to prosecute often benefit from this same preference. 43 The
preference for full litigation of the issues is secondary, however, to the
need to enforce penalty dismissals44 and the general rule imputing the
lawyer's negligence to the client.45 Furthermore, it has been suggested
that judgments entered pursuant to settlements" or voluntary 47 dismis-
sals require even greater adherence to finality than do judgments en-
tered after a full contest of the issues because they represent a conscious
choice by the parties. Class action judgments raise additional concerns
about binding persons not actually parties to the action.48 While the
42. See cases cited in note 146 infra. The relief problems of default judgments are
discussed at text accompanying notes 144-50 bkfra.
43. See, e.g., Cavalliotis v. Salomon, 357 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966); Radack v. Norwe-
gian America Line Agency, Inc., 318 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1963); Pierre v. Bernuth, Lembcke
Co., 20 F.R.D. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
44. See, e.g., Martella v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 448 F.2d 729 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974 (1971); Stevens v. Stoumen, 32 F.R.D. 385, 387 (E.D. Pa. 1963)
("[N]o attorney may be heard to say he did not prosecute an action and therefore he should
be excused."); McCawley v. Fleischmann Transp. Co., 10 F.R.D. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
45. Compare Geigel v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 44 F.R.D. 1 (D.P.R. 1968), with L.P.
Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 824 (1964), noted,
50 IOWA L. REV. 641 (1965), 67 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1965), and King v. Mordowanec, 46
F.R.D. 474 (D.R.I. 1969). Attorney negligence problems are discussed in the text accompa-
nying notes 152-70 infra.
46. See, e.g., Petry v. General Motors Corp., 62 F.R.D. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1974). On the
other hand, courts have been quite liberal in granting relief when one of the parties refuses
to comply with the agreement. See, e.g., Kelly v. Greer, 334 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1964); L.M.
Leathers' Sons v. Goldman, 252 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1958).
47. See, e.g., Gambocz v. Elhmyer, 438 F.2d 915 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919
(1971); Boehm v. Office of Alien Property, 344 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Rarick v. United
Steelworkers of America, 202 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Pa. 1962); cf. Nelms v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 11 F.R.D. 441 (N.D. Ohio 1951) (dismissal entered without consent of client). See
also text accompanying notes 86-88 infra.
48. Class action judgments typically have been the result of settlements. That fact
produces peculiar tensions. On the one hand, to allow relief on behalf of one class member
may be impossible when the settlement already has been partially distributed. Even ifit has
not, relief may destroy the entire settlement when the opposing party consented only be-
cause of the inclusiveness of the judgment. On the other hand, because the absent class
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process of generalization that follows necessarily may blur these dis-
tinctions, they should not be overlooked. Rather, this layer of com-
plexity must be considered as an essential element in the exercise of the
courts' discretion.
One further caveat must be added. Because Rule 60(b)(6) is
viewed as invoking the equitable sensibilities of the courts, a wide
range of discretionary factors may influence a court's decision on the
motion.49 For example, the court's sense of what constitutes a reason-
able time within which to seek relief frequently depends upon facts
other than the actual amount of time involved. The court will be influ-
enced significantly by whether the motion was made as soon as the
grounds for relief were discovered, or with reasonable diligence there-
after,50 or whether the movant has an excuse for the delay.51 The po-
tential prejudice to the opposing party were relief to be granted is also
of prime importance.52 In some cases the courts have taken into ac-
members were not present when the settlement was reached, the court cannot rely automati-
cally on the fact that they have consented to the judgment as determining whether it is fair to
bind them to it. Courts are most concerned that the members' interests were adequately
represented and, therefore, may be more receptive to relief motions than would ordinarily
be the case. Compare Mungin v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 318 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Fla. 1970),
af/'dper cur/am, 441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 897 (1971), with In re Four
Seasons Sec. Laws Litigation, 59 F.R.D. 667 (W.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 834 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974), and Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co.,
450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972). See generally Note, The
Importance of Being Adequate: Due Process Requirements in Class Actions Under Federal
Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1217 (1975).
49. See generally I1 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 2857.
50. See, e.g., Mungin v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 318 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Fla. 1970), affd
per cur/am, 441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 897 (1971) (no diligence); Bros Inc.
v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 320 F.2d 594, 609 (5th Cir. 1963) (diligence); King v. Mordowanec,
46 F.R.D. 474 (D.R.I. 1969) (diligence); Morgan v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 42
F.R.D 25 (W.D. La. 1967) (no diligence); Marquette Corp. v. Priester, 234 F. Supp. 799
(E.D.S.C. 1964) (diligence); Pierre v. Bernuth, Lembcke Co., 20 F.R.D. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
(diligence); United R.R. Operating Crafts v. New York, N.H. & H.R., 15 F.R.D. 365
(S.D.N.Y. 1953) (no diligence).
51. See, e.g., Beshear v. Weinzapfel, 474 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Riehlyn Labs., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D.
211 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
52. Prejudice was found and relief denied in the following cases: United States v. Ri-
chlyn Labs, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Mungin v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 318 F.
Supp. 720 (M.D. Fla. 1970), afdfper curiam, 441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
897 (1971); Stevens v. Stoumen, 32 F.R.D. 385 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Mach v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
198 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Pa. 1961). In the following cases, the absence of prejudice was
noted as a reason supporting the decision to grant relief: Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic
Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 500 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972); Smith v.
Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 426 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1970); Bros Inc. v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 320
F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1963); Erick Rios Bridoux v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207 (D.C.
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count the merits of the movant's underlying claim or defense.5 3 In
others, the courts have been influenced by the underlying substantive
policy on which the action is based, finding that it encourages relief.54
The use of these nonrule factors is perfectly proper, as they each bear
on whether equitable considerations requiring relief are present.
These additional factors, however, complicate the cogent articulation of
the courts' standard for when to utilize Rule 60(b)(6). Although the
presence of so many variables makes analysis difficult, the broader
contours of a test may be outlined.
"Extraordinary Circumstances"
Development of the standard
An inquiry into the development of the requirement of extraordi-
nary circumstances in order to reopen a judgment under Rule 60(b)(6)
must begin with the Supreme Court's 1949 decision in Klapprott v.
United States.5" This case involved an action to set aside a four-year-
old default judgment cancelling a certificate of naturalization on the
ground that the certificate had been obtained fraudulently. The peti-
tioner had been a German citizen before his naturalization in 1933.
The denaturalization proceeding charged that he had not actually re-
nounced his German allegiance, as he had participated in various Ger-
man societies and had been the leader of the German American Bund.
Klapprott sought to reopen the default under Rule 60(b)(6), arguing
that he had a defense but had not been able to appear or defend. He
claimed that he had been jailed from 1942 to 1946 while being tried for
violation of the Selective Service Act and, later, for sedition. Although
Cir. 1954); Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 195 1); Diversified
Utils. Sales, Inc. v. Monte Fusco Excavating Contracting Co., 71 F.R.D. 661 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
United States v. Williams, 109 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Ark. 1952).
53. See, e.g., Beshear v. Weinzapfel, 474 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1973); Radack v. Norwe-
gian America Line Agency, Inc., 318 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1963); Erick Rios Bridoux v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (meritorious defense); Tozer v. Charles A.
Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1951) (meritorious defense); Diversified Utils.
Sales, Inc. v. Monte Fusco Excavating Contracting Co., 71 F.R.D. 661 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (mer-
itorious defense); Byron v. Bleakley Transp. Co., 43 F.R.D. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (meritori-
ous defense); FDIC v. Alker, 30 F.R.D. 527 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'dper curiam, 316 F.2d 236
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 880 (1963); Federal Enterprises, Inc. v. Frank Allbritten
Motors, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 109 (W.D. Mo. 1954); United States v. Williams, 109 F. Supp. 456
(W.D. Ark. 1952) (meritorious defense); McCawley v. Fleischmann Transp. Co., 10 F.R.D.
624 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
54. See, e.g., Menier v. United States, 405 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1968) (Bankruptcy Act);
Bros Inc. v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 320 F.2d 594, 609 (5th Cir. 1963) (patent); L.M. Leathers'
Sons v. Goldman, 252 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1958) (patent).
55. 335 U.S. 601 (1949).
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Klapprott originally had been convicted, those convictions ultimately
were reversed. Further, he described how he had been moved from
jails in New York to Michigan, and then to the District of Columbia
during this period. He noted that he was impoverished and had writ-
ten to the American Civil Liberties Union to defend him, but that the
FBI had prevented his letter from being mailed. Finally, he pointed
out that the default was entered solely on the basis of a complaint veri-
fied by an FBI agent on information and belief.
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court granted relief. Al-
though there were two separate concurring opinions, the Court's opin-
ion, written by Justice Black, provided the basis for the development of
the extraordinary-circumstances test. Justice Black focused on three
issues: whether a default judgment was proper in a denaturalization
proceeding;56 whether the relief Klapprott sought belonged more prop-
erly under Rule 60(b)(1) or (4);57 and, finally, whether the discretion
conferred on the courts by clause (6) was sufficient to allow relief.
With regard to this last point, the Court found that the invocation of
Rule 60(b)(6) was not restricted to those situations in which the old
common law writs were available: "In simple English, the language of
the 'other reason' clause, for all reasons except the five particularly
specified, vests power in courts adequate to enable them to vacate judg-
ments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice."58
Applying this broad standard, the Court stated:
Petitioner is entitled to a fair trial. He has not had it. The Govern-
ment makes no claim that he has. Fair hearings are in accord with
elemental concepts ofjustice, and the language of the "other reason"
clause of 60(b) is broad enough to authorize the Court to set aside the
default judgment and grant petitioner a fair hearing.59
It is worth noting at this juncture that the language above, which
focuses heavily on the default character of the earlier action and the
lack of a fair trial, suggests that Klapprott had been denied due process
in the first proceeding. This interpretation seems even more plausible
when it is remembered that the underlying issue was citizenship, 60 not
simply relief from a money judgment. Nonetheless, for reasons that
are not clear, the Court rested its decision on an interpretation of clause
56. Id. at 610-12.
57. Id. at 613.
58. Id. at 614-15.
59. Id. at 615.
60. "Denaturalization consequences may be more grave than consequences that flow
from conviction for crimes." .d. at 611. See also the concurring opinion of Justices Rut-
ledge and Murphy, id. at 616.
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(6), denying the applicability of clause (4) by specifically finding that
the judgment was not void. Reliance on the "other reason" clause also
forced the Court to reconcile clause (6) with the other, more rigidly
timebound grounds for relief. Thus, the majority ruled that there was
not any mistake or inadvertence, so that the case did not potentially
overlap with situations falling under Rule 60(b)(1). Interestingly, three
of the dissenting judges argued that finality should prevail, largely be-
cause they felt that the facts fell within Rule 60(b)(1) and Klapprott's
motion was beyond the one-year limit.61
One year later, in Ackermann v. United States,62 another denatu-
ralization case, the Supreme Court made clear its desire to treat
Klapprott as the general standard for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Like
Klapprott the Ackermanns moved to reopen a four-year-old denatural-
ization judgment. However, they had been present at the trial pro-
ceedings but had not appealed when their attorney advised them of the
cost. Appealing would have required them to sell their only asset, a
house, and the alien control commissioner at their internment camp
advised them not to sell it, as he was certain that at the end of the war
all persons in their position would be freed. Mrs. Ackermann's
brother, who had been denaturalized at the same time and under the
same charge, appealed and won. At that point the Ackermanns moved
for relief, noting their reasons for not appealing and contending that
the original judgment was clearly erroneous.
In a five-to-three decision, the Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's denial of their motion. The majority found that the Ack-
ermanns' basis for relief had to be either excusable neglect, governed
by Rule 60(b)(1) and its one-year limit, or inexcusable neglect, in which
case Rule 60(b)(6) could not be invoked because no extraordinary cir-
cumstances were present.
The comparison [between Klapprott and Ackermann] strikingly
points up the difference between no choice and choice; imprisonment
and freedom of action; no trial and trial; no counsel and counsel; no
chance for negligence and inexcusable negligence .... Neither the
circumstances of petitioner nor his excuse for not appealing is so ex-
traordinary as to bring him within Klapprott or Rule 60(b)(6). 63
61. Id. at 625-27. This difference between the majority and the dissent highlights the
importance of the Court's first finding that the movants' allegations were outside of the
other provisions of Rule 60(b). At the same time, the fact that the justices could disagree so
strongly on how to apply the rule to the same facts indicates the difficulty courts have had in
construing the rule.
62. 340 U.S. 193 (1950).
63. Id. at 202.
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Thus, extraordinary circumstances exist only when the movant earlier
was denied the chance to choose between appealing or not appealing a
judgment. This interpretation of Klapprolt, as establishing the neces-
sity of showing extraordinary circumstances to merit relief under Rule
60(b)(6), has produced the current standard under the rule. Although
the standard seems clear, cases examined in the next two subsections of
this Article show the difficulty and contradictions that have befallen
courts in applying it.
It is important to note in Ackermann, and its interpretation of
Klapproti, the underlying policy judgments of the Supreme Court as it
struggled with the age-old question: truth or finality? Ackermann
posed that question squarely, as it was certain that the original judg-
ment was erroneous; in Klapprott the issue was whether the petitioner
should have the right to a full hearing at which he might prevail. The
Ackermann majority made it clear that finality must control. "There
must be an end to litigation someday, and free, calculated, deliberate
choices are not to be relieved from."64 The Court characterized the
Ackermanns' choice as deliberate because they had no right to rely on
the advice of their custodian.65 Against that broad philosophy,
Klapprott was distinguished as extraordinary and Rule 60(b)(6) as only
a narrow loophole. The dissenters,66 two of whom had joined in the
Court's opinion in Klapprott, rejected this categorization by the major-
ity in its entirety:
The result of the Court's illiberal construction of 60(b) is that these
foreign-born people, dependent on our laws for their safety and pro-
tection, are denied the right to appeal to the very court that held (on
the Government's admission) that the judgment was unsupported by
adequate evidence. It does no good to have liberalizing rules like
60(b) if, after they are written, their arteries are hardened by this
Court's resort to ancient common-law concepts. 67
Application by the lower courts
This Article's analysis of the lower courts' treatment of the ex-
traordinary-circumstances test proceeds along two lines. The first ex-
amines how well or how easily the courts have been able to identify
cases falling within the standard. The second assesses the degree to
which the lower courts have adhered to the finality philosophy of the
64. Id. at 198.
65. Id.
66. Justices Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter dissented.
67. 340 U.S. at 205.
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Ackermann majority; in other words, whether the actual use of the test
has served to protect finality, as the Supreme Court suggested it should.
The extraordinary-circumstances test has been used predomi-
nantly when a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is invoked to avoid the limits of
some other avenue of relief. If the reasons for seeking relief could
have been considered in an earlier motion under another subsection of
the rule, then the motion will be granted only if extraordinary circum-
stances are present. The same is true when the movant's basis for re-
lief itself seems inconsistent with other portions of Rule 60(b). For
example, on its face it seems ridiculous to allow a movant guilty of
excusable neglect only one year to seek relief, but to permit a movant
guilty of inexcusable neglect the use of the more flexible reasonable-
time standard. If a movant clearly demonstrates some other consistent
reason justifying relief, the extraordinary-circumstances test seems not
to come into play.68
The vast majority of cases utilizing the extraordinary-circum-
stances test involve situations in which the grounds for relief appear to
be some type of mistake or neglect that more properly should have
been raised under Rule 60(b)(1). In almost all of those cases, relief has
been denied.69 Examination of actions in which the grounds for relief
appear to fall under either clause (2) or (3) of Rule 60(b) reveals a
similar trend. Claimants have been totally unsuccessful in invoking
Rule 60(b)(6) more than one year after judgment on the grounds of
new evidence7° or fraud.71 The courts have failed to find any ex-
68. Unfortunately, the identification of "other reasons" is problematic. Sometimes in
the gray areas, courts use the Klapproll test to avoid what otherwise might be an extremely
difficult analytical problem. See text accompanying notes 104-29 infira.
69. In the following cases relief was denied: Stradley v. Cortez, 518 F.2d 488 (3d Cir.
1975); Beshear v. Weinzapfel, 474 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1973); Martella v. Marine Cooks &
Stewards Union, 448 F.2d 729 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 405 U.S. 974 (1971); Rinieri v. News
Syndicate Co., 385 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1967); Boehm v. Office of Alien Property, 344 F.2d 194
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Flett v. W.A. Alexander & Co., 302 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1962); Bell Tel.
Laboratories, Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 73 F.R.D. 16 (D. Del. 1976); Kostenbauder v.
Secretary of HEW, 71 F.R.D. 449 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Silvers v. TTC Indus., Inc., 395 F. Supp.
1318 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), af'dmem., 513 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975); Crane v. Kerr, 53 F.R.D.
311 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Stevens v. Staumen, 32 F.R.D. 385 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Mach v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 198 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Pa. 1961). See note 73 infra for cases in which relief
was granted.
70. See, e.g., Davidson v. Dixon, 386 F. Supp. 482 (D. Del. 1974); FDIC v. Alker, 30
F.R.D. 527 (E.D. Pa. 1962), affJdper curiam, 316 F.2d 236 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
880 (1963); James Blackstone Memorial Ass'n v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 28 F.R.D. 385 (D.
Conn. 1961); United States v. 72.71 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in Montgomery
County, 23 F.R.D. 635 (D. Md. 1959).
71. See, e.g., Boomhower v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 251 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
Rarick v. United Steelworkers of America, 202 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
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traordinary circumstances justifying relief. Indeed, as explained by
one judge:
Almost every losing litigant can point to some corroborating witness
he might have called or to some line of relevant questioning his attor-
ney failed to exhaust on cross-examination.
. . . Finality of judgments rendered after trial of the merits is
the general rule; relief from their operation is the extraordinary
exception.72
Thus, it appears that the finality philosophy expressed by the
Supreme Court has been adhered to by the lower courts, and that the
extraordinary-circumstances test has not been used to erode that princi-
ple, but rather to uphold it. However, this result consequently raises
the question of the utility of the extraordinary-circumstances test itself.
Because Rule 60(b)(6) relief is granted so seldomly when the grounds
relied upon are highly similar to those provided in other subsections of
the rule, how does the Kiapprott test aid the court in deciding whether
to grant the motion? Why is it not sufficient simply to rely on the
other-reason limitation on the face of clause (6)?
Unfortunately, that question is not answered merely by pointing to
cases in which a Rule 60(b)(6) motion was granted under the extraordi-
nary-circumstances test.73 In at least one, the court refused' to read
clause (6) as providing for relief exclusive of the other sections of the
rule, thus implicitly rejecting the Klapprott limitation.74 In another,
the finding of extraordinary circumstances is inconclusive, as relief also
appeared to be available under some other provision.75 In yet another,
relief was granted on facts similar to those of other cases in which no
extraordinary circumstances were found to be present.76 Finally, in
two cases involving bankruptcies, relief was granted because the courts
interpreted the substantive law underlying the actions as requiring re-
72. Davidson v. Dixon, 386 F. Supp. 482, 493-94 (D. Del. 1974).
73. See, eg., Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1079 (1976); Menier v. United States, 405 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1968); L.P. Steuart, Inc. v.
Matthews, 329 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 824 (1964); United States v.
Karahalias, 205 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953); United States v. Backofen, 176 F.2d 263 (3d Cir.
1949); Mayberry v. Maroney, 418 F. Supp. 669 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Transport Pool Div. of
Container Leasing, Inc. v. Joe Jones Trucking Co., 319 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Ga. 1970);
Marquette Corp. v. Priester, 234 F. Supp. 799 (E.D.S.C. 1964). One case is simply a con-
fused application of the test. Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1079 (1976). The case is discussed in the text accompanying notes 101-03
infra.
74. United States v. Karahalias, 205 F.2d 331, 333 (2d Cir. 1953).
75. Mayberry v. Maroney, 418 F. Supp. 669 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (Rule 60(b)(5)).
76. See L.P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
824 (1964) (gross neglect of plaintiffs counsel found to merit reief). Compare cases cited
note 155 infra.
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lief 77 Thus, the extraordinary circumstances did not pertain to the
facts of the case, but to the kind of proceeding involved.
Examining the cases in which relief was denied under the
Klapproti standard likewise reveals nothing about the actual usefulness
of the test.78  In most cases, the courts simply make conclusory state-
ments to the effect that the petitioner has demonstrated only ordinary
mistake or neglect,79 or inexcusable neglect, 80 or a claim of only ordi-
nary fraud, 81 or one simply presenting new evidence, 82 and that no ex-
traordinary circumstances exist to place the motion outside of the first
three clauses of Rule 60(b) and within Rule 60(b)(6).8 3 Because of
such abbreviated statements of the standard and its application, it is
77. Menier v. United States, 405 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1968); Marquette Corp. v. Priester,
234 F. Supp. 799 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
78. In a few cases the courts have explained why the extraordinary-circumstances test
was not met. See, e.g., Rinieri v. News Syndicate Co., 385 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1967); James
Blackstone Memorial Ass'n v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 28 F.R.D. 385 (D. Conn. 1961).
79. See, e.g., Stradley v. Cortez, 518 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1975); Rader v. Cliburn, 476
F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1973); Boehm v. Office of Alien Property, 344 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Hawkins v. Lindsley, 327 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1964); Flett v. W.A. Alexander & Co., 302 F.2d
321 (7th Cir. 1962); John E. Smith's Sons v. Lattimer Foundry & Mach. Co., 239 F.2d 815
(3d Cir. 1956); Crane v. Kerr, 53 F.R.D. 311 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Mach v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
198 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
80. See, e.g., Beshear v. Weinzapfel, 474 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1973); Martella v. Marine
Cooks & Stewards Union, 448 F.2d 729 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974 (1971); Kos-
tenbauder v. Secretary of HEW, 71 F.R.D. 449 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Carrethers v. St. Louis-S.F.
Ry., 264 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Okla. 1967); Stevens v. Stoumen, 32 F.R.D. 385 (E.D. Pa.
1963).
81. See, e.g., Boomhower v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 251 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
82. See, e.g., Davidson v. Dixon, 386 F. Supp. 482 (D. Del. 1974); FDIC v. Alker, 30
F.R.D. 527 (E.D. Pa. 1962), afdper curiam, 316 F.2d 236 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
880 (1963); James Blackstone Memorial Ass'n v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 28 F.R.D. 385 (D.
Conn. 1961); United States v. 72.71 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in Montgomery
County, 23 F.R.D. 635 (D. Md. 1959).
83. See, e.g., Ruddies v. Auburn Spark Plug Co., 261 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
The same conclusory finding of no extraordinary circumstances appears in several cases
in which the movant attempts to use Rule 60(b)(6) to move for a new trial after the 10 days
allowed in Rule 59(b) have elapsed. See, e.g., Hansen v. United States, 340 F.2d 142 (8th
Cir. 1965); John E. Smith's Sons Co. v. Lattimer Foundry & Mach. Co., 239 F.2d 815 (3d
Cir. 1956); Davidson v. Dixon, 386 F. Supp. 482 (D. Del. 1974); Tann v. Service Distribs.,
Inc., 56 F.R.D. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aft'd, 481 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1973); FDIC v. Alker, 30
F.R.D. 527 (E.D. Pa. 1962), afj'dper curiam, 316 F.2d 236 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
880 (1963). Motions made when the movant has failed to file a timely appeal also have
been found, summarily, to fail the Klapprott test. See, e.g., Fackelman v. Bell, 564 F.2d 734
(5th Cir. 1977); Martinez-McBean v. Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1977); Interna-
tional Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1977); Horace v. St. Louis Sw. R.R.,
489 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1974); Whiteleather v. United States, 264 F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1959);
Berryhill v. United States, 199 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1952); Stewart Sec. Corp. v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 71 F.R.D. 32 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Geigel v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 44 F.R.D. 1
(D.P.R. 1968).
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difficult to determine if KIlapprott has produced a workable and mean-
ingful standard.8 4 Indeed, the only cases which seem clearly to have
benefited from the test are other denaturalization cases. In those situa-
tions not only has Klapprott provided a needed relief mechanism, but
the courts appear able to tell easily when extraordinary circumstances
are present by looking to whether there was a default, whether the de-
fendant was incarcerated and unable to obtain counsel, and whether
the defendant was in a condition to make decisions concerning his de-
fense.85 Denaturalization cases, however, represent a limited number
of cases and do not justify the wholesale adoption of the test in areas
where issues concerning the defendant's diligence and ability to defend
are more hazy. Thus, it is not surprising that the test does not seem to
have contributed much to the quest for fair and identifiable relief
standards in other settings.
The greatest apparent impact of the extraordinary-circumstances
test has been to force the trial courts to focus on whether the movant
made a fair and deliberate choice at some earlier time not to move for
relief. If so, there would be no reason now to relieve the movant of
that choice. 86 Although at first glance this might seem to be a serious
and important addition, in practice its impact is minimal.87 Unlike the
facts in many denaturalization proceedings, in virtually all other ac-
84. One way to identify a standard from such abbreviated statements is by listing and
describing the facts of those cases that have granted and those that have denied relief-a
task best suited to a treatise writer. See 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.27 (2d ed.
1975); 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 2864.
85. See, e.g., Zurini v. United States, 189 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1951); United States v.
Backofen, 176 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1949); United States v. Failla, 164 F. Supp. 307 (D.N.J.
1958).
86. See, e.g., Horace v. St. Louis Sw. R.R., 489 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1974); Lubben v.
Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 27,453 F.2d 645 (Ist Cir. 1972); Rinieri v. News Syndicate
Co., 385 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1967); Berryhill v. United States, 199 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1952);
Bell Tel. Laboratories, Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 73 F.R.D. 16 (D. DeL 1976); Stewart Sec.
Corp. v. Guaranty Trust Co., 71 F.R.D. 32 (W.D. Okla. 1976); DeLong's, Inc. v. Stupp Bros.
Bridge & Iron Co., 40 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Mo. 1965); Rarick v. United Steelworkers of
America, 202 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Pa. 1962); Loucke v. United States, 21 F.R.D. 305
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
87. The Ackermann criteria were particularly influential in Transport Pool Div. of
Container Leasing, Inc. v. Joe Jones Trucking Co., 319 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Ga. 1970). The
court granted relief from a default judgment entered when defendant's attorney failed to file
an answer and then disappeared. However, the court makes it clear how few situations
would meet the test: "Here the defendant was an uneducated layman. He does not read
well and even after patient explanation has difficulty comprehending the involutions of a
legal proceeding. It also appears from the evidence that during the period in question he
also suffered from extreme anxiety about his business and spent several successive periods in
a veterans hospital while he was being treated for hypertension." Id. at 1312. See also
Lucas v. City of Juneau, 20 F.R.D. 407 (D. Alas. 1957).
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tions the parties are represented by counsel and the fact that an attor-
ney has made the decision, or negligently has failed to make it, seems
to convince the courts that the decision was "informed. '8 8 Moreover,
the courts are faced with the general rule that a lawyer's negligence is
to be imputed to the client, thereby precluding relief.89 Because of
these principles, reference to the "free and deliberate" choice rationale
in Ackermann most frequently has served merely as another talisman
supporting the denial of relief.
The failure of the courts to explain more fully what constitutes an
extraordinary circumstance does not indicate necessarily that the stan-
dard is meaningless. It does suggest, however, the difficulty in articu-
lating the criteria on which the test is based. In many ways we are
confronted by what appears to be a test resting on a standard akin to
that described by Justice Stewart in the pornography area when he
said: "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I
understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and per-
haps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when
I see it . .. "90 Although it is disappointing perhaps, this does not in
itself suggest that the standard be abandoned. Judges have long oper-
ated with just such vague criteria and most are competent and comfort-
able in doing so. One danger, of course, in having such a vague
standard is that courts will begin to rely primarily on their feelings as to
the correctness of the original judgment in order to decide whether re-
lief is appropriate.91 Although it is quite proper for a court to take into
account whether reopening a judgment would be frivolous, it would be
inappropriate for a Rule 60(b) hearing to be turned into a trial on the
merits. Despite this concern, one might conclude that on the basis of
the inquiry thus far, the extraordinary-circumstances test has not pro-
duced much confusion, has not led to an erosion of finality, but, rather,
has supported finality by acting as a limitation on Rule 60(b)(6) 92 while
providing a necessary escape valve for truly needy claimants.
88. See, e.g., Dal Int'l Trading Co. v. Sword Line, Inc., 286 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1961);
Carrethers v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 264 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Okla. 1967).
89. See text accompanying notes 152-54 infra.
90. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion).
91. See, e.g., Stradley v. Cortez, 518 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1975); Silvers v. TTC Indus.,
Inc., 395 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), affdmem., 513 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975).
92. A representative statement of the lower courts' view of the policy underlying the
extraordinary-circumstances test can be found in Loucke v. United States, 21 F.R.D. 305,
308 (S.D.N.Y. 1957): "[T]his rule was not designed to supersede the normal and ordinary
channels of relief. Nor was it intended to invest the court with an omnipotence whose
boundary is defined only by the court's conscience. Considerations of judicial administra-
tion and of the stability of the law no less than the obligation of doing individual equity
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This conclusion falters, however, upon examination of the rather
wide range of situations in which the test has been erroneously invoked
and applied. These cases suggest that the problems that have occurred
in the lower courts far outweigh the benefits in the narrow range of
cases in which the extraordinary-circumstances test has operated to al-
low relief.
Problems in applying the standard
One of the greatest difficulties with the extraordinary-circum-
stances test lies in the failure of several lower courts to read Kilapprott
and Ackermann as suggesting a standard to be applied only when it is
necessary to harmonize clause (6) with the other provisions of the rule.
Instead, many courts have read the extraordinary-circumstances re-
quirement into the other provisions of the rule,93 thereby restricting re-
lief even within one year of judgment. In doing so, they have upset the
balance between truth and finality nurtured by the Supreme Court and
set out so carefully in the rule. The first five clauses of Rule 60(b)
enunciate specific categories in which truth demands that an otherwise
final judgment be reopened. The only limitation placed by the
rulemakers is one of time. Likewise, the Supreme Court was con-
cerned, in Klafpprott and Ackermann, with how to protect the rule's
limitations and yet interpret clause (6) in such a way as to provide for
relief when justice demanded. While it upheld finality for all but the
extraordinary case under Rule 60(b)(6), the Court did not attempt to
limit the otherwise available avenues of relief. The failure of several
lower courts to recognize this and their overly-broad use of the
IMlapprott standard has resulted in unfair restrictions on parties seeking
must be balanced and adjusted. An explicit choice of values is represented by the landmark
decision in the Ackermann case .... "
93. See, ag., Hoffman v. Celebrezze, 405 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1969); Di Vito v. Fidelity
& Deposit Co. of Maryland, 361 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1966); Torockio v. Chamberlain Mfg.
Co., 56 F.R.D. 82 (W.D. Pa. 1972), afd, 474 F.2d 1340 (3d Cir. 1973); In re White, 336 F.
Supp. 735 (E.D. Wis. 1971); United States v. $3,216.59 in United State Currency, 41 F.R.D.
433 (D.S.C. 1967). In Mayberry v. Maroney, 418 F. Supp. 669 (W.D. Pa. 1976), the test was
applied in conjunction with clause (5), but the motion was granted. See also Polites v.
United States, 364 U.S. 426 (1960).
The courts also apply the extraordinary-circumstances standard when the movant
presents an "other reason" meriting relief under clause (6), and moves within a year of the
judgment in as timely a fashion as possible. In most instances, this added requirement
precludes relief. See, ag., Stradley v. Cortez, 518 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1975); Collins v. City of
Wichita, 254 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1958); DeLong's, Inc. v. Stupp Bros. Bridge & Iron Co., 40
F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Mo. 1965); Von Wedel v. McGrath, 100 F. Supp. 434 (D.N.J. 1951), aI'd
per curiar, 194 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1952). But see Kelly v. Greer, 334 F.2d 434 (3d Cir.
1964) (relief granted).
September 1978]
relief. Moreover, as some courts quite properly have not imposed this
added requirement,94 the result has been inconsistency in the adminis-
tration of justice. Other courts confronted with this conflicting or, at
the very least, ambiguous authority have in turn rendered confused
opinions in which the bases for their decisions are unclear. A closer
look at two examples will illustrate the existing level of confusion.
Torockio v. Chamberlain Mfg. Co.95 involved a motion under Rule
60(b)(1) and (6) for relief from the dismissal of a sex discrimination
class action. The dismissal was entered because the plaintiffs failed to
file a notice of the right-to-sue letter with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission prior to commencing the action. The plaintiffs'
motion alleged that the required notice had been filed properly. Thus,
the court noted that either plaintiffs' attorney had mistaken the law and
had not realized that the allegation was required, or the plaintiffs had
not told the attorney of their filing.
Despite the fact that the motion was made within one year, the
court relied upon the extraordinary-circumstances test, stating that if
relief was allowed under Rule 60(b)(1), "all semblance of the finality of
judgments would be lost," 96 as it would allow a horizontal appeal for a
mistake of law after the time for a direct appeal had lapsed. The court
then held that the notice had been intentionally withheld so that there
was no excusable neglect. It found further that because the grounds
for relief fell within clause (1), clause (6) was not applicable. 97 Finally,
after appearing to be leaning toward a denial of relief, the court
granted a motion to validate the filing of a notice of appeal nuncpro
tunc because the failure to file that notice was excusable and no one
would be prejudiced!
While the result in Torockio is undoubtedly justifiable, the reason-
ing of the court is unnecessarily convoluted. The court appears to
have done through the back door what it erroneously felt the rule did
not allow through the front. It is this kind of confusion that easily may
discourage relief by courts less willing to follow such a circuitous route.
Thus, not surprisingly, there is a wide range of cases in which relief has
been denied because the motion more properly fell under clauses (1)-
94. See, e.g., Bruno v. Herold, 39 F.R.D. 570 (N.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 368 F.2d 187 (2d
Cir. 1966). But see Harrell v. Harder, 369 F. Supp. 810 (D. Conn. 1974); Hansen v. United
States, 340 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1965).
95. 56 F.R.D. 82 (W.D. Pa. 1972), affd, 474 F.2d 1340 (3d Cir. 1973).
96. Id. at 87.
97. Id. at 87 n. 1.
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(3)98 or because it should have been raised in a new trial motion under
Rule 59,99 or on a timely -appeal00 and in which the courts never men-
tion the extraordinary-circumstances test. Of course the failure of the
courts to consider the Klapprott rationale may mean that the cases
clearly did not present any special circumstances; in most situations,
this is undoubtedly true. In some instances, however, the issue may
not have been decided simply because the courts or litigants were un-
able to understand how the standard applied.
On the opposite side of the spectrum, the inherent vagueness of the
extraordinary-circumstances test has permitted other courts, in their
confusion, to grant relief in situations that, at best, are questionable. A
recent Tenth Circuit decision illustrates this point. Pierce v. Cook &
Co. 101 presented the problem that arises when parties involved in the
same auto accident sue in different courts and obtain different results
because the law is interpreted and applied inconsistently. In Pierce, a
federal district court interpreted state law as holding that a shipper was
not liable for the torts of an independent contractor. That decision
was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit in January 1971. Other persons
involved in the accident sued in state court. On appeal, in May, 1974,
the state supreme court changed the law and imposed liability. In No-
vember, 1974, the federal plaintiffs succeeded in moving to reopen their
98. Examples of cases under each subdivision follow. Rule 60(b)(1): Bershad v. Mc-
Donough, 469 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1972); Gulf Coast Bldg. & Supply Co. v. IBEW Local 480,
460 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1972); Transit Cas. Co. v. Security Trust Co., 441 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); United States v. Erdoss, 440 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom Horvath v. United States, 404 U.S. 849 (1971); Costa v. Chapkines, 316
F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Richlyn Labs., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Pa.
1973); Caputo v. Globe Indem. Co., 41 F.R.D. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Davis v. Wadsworth
Constr. Co., 27 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Vaughan v. Petroleum Corp., 120 F. Supp. 175 (D.
Conn. 1953). Rule 60(b)(2): Sunfire Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 335 F.2d 958 (6th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 990 (1965). Rule 60(b)(3): Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 461 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 883 (1972); Simons v. United States, 452
F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1971); Petry v. General Motors Corp., 62 F.R.D. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Cooper Agency v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 948 (D.S.C. 1971).
99. See, e.g., Lapiczak v. Zaist, 54 F.R.D. 546 (D. Vt. 1972).
100. See, eg., In re Morrow, 502 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1974); Cinerama, Inc. v. Sweet
Music, S.A., 482 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. United Mine Workers, 473 F.2d 118
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Lord v. Helmandollar, 348 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Demers v. Brown,
343 F.2d 427 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 818 (1965); Wagner v. United States, 316 F.2d
871 (2d Cir. 1963); Hartmau v. Lauchli, 304 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1962); Williams v. Sahli, 292
F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 977 (1962); Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Barrett,
213 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1954); Perrin v. Aluminum Co. of America, 197 F.2d 254 (9th Cir.
1952); Gilmore v. Hinman, 191 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Kowall v. United States, 53
F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1971); Edwards v. Velvac, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 504 (E.D. Wis. 1956).
101. 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079 (1976), noted 29
RUTGERS L. REv. 921 (1976).
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judgment. That action was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit, which char-
acterized the situation as extraordinary: "The federal courts in which
plaintiffs were forced to litigate have given them substantially different
treatment than that received in state court by another injured in the
same accident. The outcome determination principle mandated by
Erie v. Tompkins has been violated."102
The wide-ranging impact of this decision, as well as the question-
able validity of its finding of extraordinary circumstances, is well ar-
ticulated by a dissent.
The majority appears to hold that divergent results from a common
vehicular accident are, per se, grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(6),
at least in diversity cases. If my interpretation of the intended im-
pact of the majority ruling is correct then the court has indeed
plowed new ground, for no present authority supports such a rule.
Federal judgments in common disaster diversity cases can then only
be considered as dormant, not final, even though the case be the in-
verse of the one we here consider. A paid judgment would seem to
be recoverable and resultant confusion inevitable. 0 3
These kinds of problems suggest that the extraordinary-circum-
stances standard of Klapproll presents great potential for abuse.
Before addressing the issue of how to develop a more workable stan-
dard, it is important to investigate the cases in which the courts have
struggled with the statutory "other reason" prerequisite of Rule
60(b)(6). In this way, a more complete overview of how well the provi-
sion has operated can be obtained.
"Other Reason"
The only explicit requirement set out in Rule 60(b)(6) is that the
movant must present some "other reason justifying relief." To judge
the usefulness of this provision, it is necessary to review the instances in
which courts have found it easy to decide whether the "other reason"
rationale of clause (6) applies. Following that, areas in which inconsis-
tent court decisions point to uncertainty and inequity in the use of the
"other reason" test will be examined.
There appear to be only a few situations that can be identified
clearly as presenting "other reasons" requiring relief.14 In one case
the judgment in a patent infringement suit was based on a settlement
102. 518 F.2d at 723.
103. Id. at 725.
104. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972); Bros Inc. v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 320 F.2d 594 (5th Cir.
1963).
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agreement with which the patent owner subsequently failed to comply.
The court granted relief under Rule 60(b)(6), saying: "The refusal on
the part of the appellant to carry out its part of the contract by which
the judgment was obtained fully justified the Court in taking appropri-
ate action to restore the parties to their status quo prior to the execution
of the agreement."' 1 5 In another action that arose out of an auto acci-
dent, the plaintiff was granted relief five years after a judgment was
entered, again, pursuant to stipulation.10 6 The plaintiff reopened the
case on the ground that his attorney and former wife acted fraudulently
and deceitfully, having obtained a judgment under which the plaintiff
had received nothing. The court found that while clause (3) refers to
the fraud of an adverse party, there is no specific provision referring to
fraud by one's own counsel, so that the case presented an equitable
ground for relief under clause (6). On a similar rationale, the fraud of
a third-party witness has qualified as an "other reason" under Rule
60(b)(6). 10 7 The provision also has been deemed applicable when the
losing party was not notified of the entry of judgment until the time for
an appeal had passed.108 In these cases the courts clearly have been
concerned with the fact that the party never had an effective opportu-
nity to pursue an appeal or to move in a more timely fashion under the
other portions of the rule.l°9
All of the above situations present few problems to the courts, as
there does not appear to be any conflict with the other, more limited,
avenues of relief. The cases truly illustrate other reasons. Conversely,
in a wide range of circumstances the courts appear to have had little
difficulty in ascertaining that the grounds relied upon actually should
have been raised under some other provision, and that no "other rea-
105. See L.M. Leathers' Sons v. Goldman, 252 F.2d 188, 190 (6th Cir. 1958). See also
Kelly v. Greer, 334 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1964); Scott v. Young, 307 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Va.
1969), aftd, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1970).
106. McKinney v. Boyle, 404 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 992 (1969).
107. See Armour & Co. v. Nard, 56 F.R.D. 610 (N.D. Iowa 1972).
108. See, ag., Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises v. Smithsonian Inst., 500 F.2d
808 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 426 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1970); Caval-
liotis v. Salomon, 357 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966); Radack v. Norwegian America Line Agency,
Inc., 318 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1963); Byron v. Bleakley Transp. Co., 43 F.R.D. 413 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); United States v. Miller, 9 F.R.D. 506 (M.D. Pa. 1949). But see In re Morrow, 502
F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1974).
109. The grounds described in the text should not be confused with those in which a lack
of notice suggests that due process has been violated, permitting the judgment to be re-
opened under Rule 60(b)(4). In those cases there is no proper notice of the action and a
default results. In the cases cited in note 108 supra, the parties are aware of the action, but
not that a judgment has been entered.
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sons" were present. 1'0 For example, movants who claim relief based
on a clearly-erroneous judgment have been denied relief because the
appropriate vehicle for that challenge is a timely appeal."' In other
cases, the motion has been denied because the reason alleged, although
not more appropriately raised elsewhere, is not one requiring relief
from judgment in order to accomplish justice." 12
The preceding cases demonstrate that clause (6) has served as a
useful, perhaps even necessary, tool and that in many instances the
courts have decided without difficulty that it has been properly in-
yoked. An even greater number of cases, however, raise questions
about its general usefulness. The courts have not always been content
to construe the provision narrowly. Many have strained to apply Rule
60(b)(6) in situations seemingly governed by other provisions. Others,
appearing to ignore any notion of exclusivity, have granted relief that
would have been barred under clauses (1)-(5) without even referring to
the extraordinary circumstances discussed earlier. The result has been
some questionable and conflicting decisions. Admittedly, the fact that
the courts appear to be ignoring apparent limitations or engaging in
strained analyses does not necessarily mean that all those decisions are
wrong or inequitable. Rather, it illustrates court confusion." 3 That
confusion, in turn, may prevent parties with similar cases from receiv-
ing similar treatment under the rule, thereby producing inequitable and
inconsistent results.
Three areas seem to have produced the greatest difficulties. In the
first, the courts have been faced with reconciling clauses (5) and (6).' '4
The specific question is not one of timing, as the reasonable-time limi-
tation applies to both clauses; instead, the issue is whether the "other
reason" justification can be invoked to circumvent judicially imposed
110. See, e.g., Tobriner v. Chefer, 335 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Colonial Bank & Trust
Co. v. Cahill, 424 F. Supp. 1200, 1206 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Tann v. Service Distribs., Inc., 56
F.R.D. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affid, 481 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. 72.71 Acres
of Land, More or Less, Situate in Montgomery County, 23 F.R.D. 635 (D. Md. 1959).
111. See, e.g., Hartman v. Lauchli, 304 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1962); Annat v. Beard, 277
F.2d 554 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 908 (1960); United States v. Failla, 164 F. Supp.
307 (D.N.J. 1958).
112. See, e.g., Allinsmith v. Funke, 421 F.2d 1350 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Cato
Bros., Inc., 273 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 927 (1960); United States v.
City of Milwaukee, 441 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Hughes v. Sanders, 287 F. Supp.
332 (E.D. Okla. 1968); Von Wedel v. McGrath, 100 F. Supp. 434 (D.N.J. 1951), afdper
curiam, 194 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1952).
113. See, e.g., Tribble v. Bruin, 279 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1960).
114. See Comment, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b): Standards/or Relieffrom
Judgments Due to Changes in Law, 43 U. CHI. L. REa. 646 (1976).
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substantive limitations on the fifth clause. It has been held that the
language allowing relief when "a prior judgment upon which it is based
has been reversed or otherwise vacated" is applicable only when the
judgment now being challenged rested or relied primarily on the dis-
carded authority. 115 The question then is whether clause (6) can pro-
vide relief for similar reasons but in a broader range of situations. In
at least four cases, the courts have granted relief under clause (6),116
relying heavily on the apparent injustice of tying a party to a decree
when the law has changed in the interim. In three of those cases, no
reference was made to clause (5),117 although that provision, with its
limitations, was at least arguably applicable. Those courts never at-
tempted to reconcile the overlapping scope of the last two clauses of
Rule 60(b).
The second issue on which conflicting decisions arise is whether a
judgment can be amended under Rule 60(b)(6).11 8 Typically, such
motions are made under Rules 52(b) or 59(e), which are restricted to
motions made within ten days of judgment. Because of the need to
state an "other reason" for granting relief, one would expect that a mo-
tion that essentially was a delayed motion for correction would be de-
nied, and a few courts have so held.119 Indeed, one court went on to
find further implied limitations arising from the other clauses of Rule
60(b). Because the rules do not allow modification even where new
evidence is discovered if such evidence could have been discovered by
"due diligence," then they should not permit a judgment to be ques-
tioned because of a purported defect expressly appearing on the face of
115. See Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426 (1960); Berryhill v. United States, 199
F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1952).
116. Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1079
(1976); McGrath v. Potash, 199 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 296
F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969); Pierce Oil Corp. v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 619 (E.D. Va.
1949). See also Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426, 440 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
117. Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079
(1976); McGrath v. Potash, 199 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 296
F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969).
118. See Note, Federal Rule 60(b): Finality of Civil Judgments v. Self-Correction by Dis-
trict Court ofJudicialError of Law, 43 NoTRE DAME LAW. 98 (1967). An analogous prob-
lem has arisen in interpreting Rules 52(a) and 60(b). See Note, Federal Rules 52(a) and
60(b)-.4 Chinese Puzzle, 21 Sw. L.J. 339 (1967).
Motions to amend judgments should not be confused with motions to correct the judg-
ment due to clerical error. The latter are governed by Rule 60(a) and have no time restric-
tions. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Pattiz, 41 F.R.D. 456 (E.D. Mo. 1967), a/I'd, 386 F.2d 300 (8th
Cir. 1968).
119. See, e.g., Stradley v. Cortez, 518 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1975); James Blackstone Memo-
rial Ass'n v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 28 F.R.D. 385 (D. Conn. 1961).
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it. 120 Despite this cogent reasoning, other courts have applied Rule
60(b)(6) without ever confronting this problem, simply noting that jus-
tice requires that a proper judgment be entered.' 21
The third problem area, the reconciliation of clauses (1) and (6),
has posed the greatest difficulty. As noted in the preceding section,
this problem was the impetus for the development of the extraordinary-
circumstances test. 122 That standard, however, has not resolved the
conflict. Although some courts simply have denied relief on the
grounds that the claim was one of neglect and, thus, not an "other rea-
son" under clause (6),123 others have strained to describe the case or
define the type of neglect or mistake in such a way as to allow the
residual provision to apply. Thus, we find cases in which a mistake of
law is deemed outside of Rule 60(b)(1)124 or in which the gross neglect
of counsel coupled with the absence of any neglect on the part of the
client is deemed to show an "other reason" warranting relief.125 In this
last situation the courts completely overlook the general rule that the
attorney's negligence is to be imputed to the client. 126 In one case the
court appears to have ignored any potential limitations that might be
inferred from clause (1), stating: "In any event, it is never too late to set
aside an unjust judgment."'127 Finally, in two cases in which the mo-
vant, acting without the advice of counsel, mistakenly failed to move
earlier, it was held that the plaintiffs error should not preclude relief,
evidently because an error in judgment by the client alone is not within
clause (1).128 The results in these last cases are probably justifiable
under Klapprolt and Ackermann as they may be viewed as situations in
120. James Blackstone Memorial Ass'n v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 28 F.R.D. 385, 387 (D.
Conn. 1961).
121. See, e.g., Martin v. H.M.B. Constr. Co., 279 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1960); District of
Columbia v. Stackhouse, 239 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Caraway v. Sain, 23 F.R.D. 657
(N.D. Fla. 1959). See also Davis v. Pitchess, 518 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1974).
122. See text accompanying notes 93-100 supra.
123. See, e.g., Kostenbauder v. Secretary of HEW, 71 F.R.D. 449 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Lap-
iczak v. Zaist, 54 F.R.D. 546 (D. Vt. 1972); Edwards v. Velvac, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 504 (E.D.
Wis. 1956).
124. See, e.g., Kinnear Corp. v. Crawford Door Sales Co., 49 F.R.D. 3 (D.S.C. 1970).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1977); Rooks v. American
Brass Co., 263 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1959); King v. Mordowanec, 46 F.R.D. 474 (D.R.I. 1969);
Nelms v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 11 F.R.D. 441 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
126. See 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.27[2] (2d ed. 1975); see notes 153-58 &
accompanying text infra.
127. Fleming v. Mante, 10 F.R.D. 391,392 (N.D. Ohio 1950). See also In re Cremidas'
Estate, 14 F.R.D. 15 (D. Alas. 1953).
128. United States v. 96 Cases, More or Less, of Fireworks, 244 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. Ohio
1965); Lucas v. City of Juneau, 20 F.R.D. 407 (D. Alas. 1957).
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which there was no deliberate choice. However, the rationale for these
decisions, that to deny relief "would be a rather harsh penalty for an
error in judgment,"'' 2 9 is highly questionable given the limited relief the
rulemakers appear to have intended for errors and mistakes in
judgment.
In light of all these cases, it is clear that the "other reason" require-
ment of Rule 60(b)(6) has not been applied uniformly. Like the ex-
traordinary-circumstances test alternatively used in clause (6) cases, it
has produced another layer of confusion for courts and litigants con-
templating relief from judgments.
Summary and Criticism
The starting point for this Article was an inquiry into whether the
fears of some of the critics of Rule 60(b) were well founded. The pre-
ceding discussion of the courts' development and application of the ex-
traordinary-circumstances test and their interpretation of the "other
reason" requisite of clause (6) provides us with some answers. First,
the concern that the discretion conferred on the courts by the rule
would destroy the principle of finality has been proven to be largely
unwarranted. The cases interpreting Rule 60(b)(6) illustrate the extent
to which the courts have been trying to avoid that result. Rulings to
the effect that relief under clause (6) must be exclusive of other provi-
sions or will be permitted only in extraordinary circumstances establish
presumptions for finality. Moreover, the fact that the provision has
been relied upon successfully in only a small number of cases shows
that the use of Rule 60(b)(6) does not represent directly any serious
change in the historic preference of American courts for finality.
Unfortunately, however, the cases uncover a whole new ground
for criticism. The large number of conflicting and confusing 130 deci-
sions indicates that the courts often have not been able to deal comfort-
ably with the discretion granted them. The fact that in most instances
they have not abused their discretion does not alone justify the current
situation. The problems the courts have had in interpreting the rule
actually may serve to undermine finality.131 Initially, the confused
129. 244 F. Supp. at 273.
130. In addition to the types of confusion described in the text, Rule 60(b)(6) has been
cited in cases involving stays of execution, see, e.g., Chapin & Chapin, Inc. v. McShane
Contracting Co., 374 F. Supp. 1191 (W.D. Pa. 1974), and attorneys' liens, see, e.g., United
States v. Jacobs, 187 F. Supp. 630 (D. Md. 1960).
131. See Comment, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b): Standards/or Reliefrfom
Judgments Due to Changes in Law, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 646, 663 (1976).
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state of the law encourages litigation over these issues; such litigation
contradicts the notion that the current rule ensures certainty. Further,
the courts' difficulty in deciding whether relief is warranted often pro-
longs litigation.
One bizarre example of this phenomenon is Simons v. United
States. 32 The plaintiff in that case sought to have a 1948 decree natu-
ralizing herself and her deceased husband reopened and annulled
twenty-two years later. She claimed that she knowingly made false
statements at the time of her naturalization, that neither she nor her
husband ever intended to reside in the United States, and, in fact, that
they had never done so. Her complaint was dismissed, and the Second
Circuit affirmed. The appellate court noted the reason behind the mo-
tion. It found that the parties had obtained a Mexican divorce in 1964
and the husband had died recently, leaving all of his property to the
furtherance of education and science. Thus, the plaintiff wanted to be
considered a Dutch citizen in the hope that the Netherlands would not
recognize the divorce so that she could claim an elective share of the
estate. With this in mind, the court held, first, that Rule 60(b)(3) was
not applicable because her claim did not rest on the fraud of an adverse
party, and that, second, "it would be reading clause (6) most perversely
to say that it authorizes attack for one's own or a nonadverse party's
fraud twenty-two years after the judgment."'' 33
Although it is comforting to realize that the rule was applied with
proper restraint, that such a tactic was attempted and pursued through
an appeal has unsettling implications. It is likely that the movant's
attorney knew that the odds against success were great. Nonetheless, a
system of relief that even suggests to litigants that it may be worthwhile
to bring such motions should be questioned. Some rethinking should
be done about the problem. The remainder of this Article attempts to
accomplish that task.
Policies and Solutions
As it has been throughout this Article, the assumption at the time
of the 1948 amendment of Rule 60(b), was that once a judgment is
entered, finality generally should predominate over the quest for objec-
tive truth. 34 Although finality, thus far, appears to triumph under
132. 452 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1971).
133. Id. at 1115.
134. Prior to judgment, the attainment of truth may be the courts' guiding principle.
See Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966); Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal
View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975).
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current practices, it also has been noted that the attempt to encourage
courts to exercise their equitable discretion has not been very success-
ful. Perhaps this is because of the apparently unresolvable conflict
posed to the courts. Regardless of the reason, change is needed. A
more satisfying balance of these competing aims can best be achieved
by deciding which aim is to be accorded more weight. Either finality
must be firmly embraced, with certain well-defined exceptions, and we
must be content to live with the occasional unjust results, or truth must
be our mistress despite the degree of uncertainty that will result.
The rationale for continuing to emphasize finality might be seen as
four fold: (1) there is no assurance that relitigation will produce any
different result;135 (2) if the parties had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate, then due-process requirements have been met; (3) judicial
economy demands that there be an end to litigation because the system
cannot tolerate the burden of constant relitigation; and (4) finality pro-
duces the certainty in the law that is necessary to foster public confi-
dence in the judicial system. 36 The interesting thing about this
rationale is what it assumes about truth. In particular, the first and
second reasons appear to rest on the assumption that absolute truth is
probably unattainable. 37 The notion that the same result may occur
upon a reevaluation of the same facts also may reflect a certain cyni-
cism about the adversary system. The concern is not for the ultimate
truth of the underlying facts, but for results. 38 Moreover, due process
does not guarantee that truth will be pursued no matter how long or
arduous the process. It merely makes certain that the parties receive at
135. "A good deal can be said for taking the judgment as the point of diminishing re-
turns in the human-and therefore fallible-pursuit of perfect justice." F. JAMES, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 11.1, at 518 (1965).
136. The Supreme Court aptly described the social need for certainty in a decision in-
volving the binding effect of a prior judgment. It argued that the general rule of a binding
conclusive determination "is demanded by the very object for which civil courts have been
established, which is to secure the peace and repose of society by the settlement of matters
capable of judicial determination. Its enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social
order, for, the aid of judicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights of
person and property, if, as between parties and their privies, conclusiveness did not attend
the judgments of such tribunals in respect of all matters properly put in issue and actually
determined by them." Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897). See also
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 112 (1942).
137. See Uviller, The Advocate, The Truth, and Judicial Hackles: 4 Reaction to Judge
Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1067, 1079 (1975). See generaly Hart, Law in the Per-
spective of Philosophy. 1776-1976, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 538, 550 (1976). But compare Dwor-
kin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057 (1975).
138. See Frankel, The Searchfor Trut" 4n Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031
(1975). See generaly O.W. Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1918).
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least one opportunity to do so. In that sense, the adversary process is
presented as the best means to attempt the search, but without assur-
ance of success.139
Perhaps this analysis is not so much cynical as it is realistic.1 4°
Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that not all judicial systems' 4' and
legal writers accept this thesis, 42 and persuasive arguments can be
made as to why truth should be pursued at all times despite the cost.
Although these debates form a large part of jurisprudential literature,
this inquiry need not attempt to define the ultimate purpose of the law.
Fortunately, the decision as to whether truth or finality is of greater
value is more easily dealt with in the context of the specific problem at
hand. 143
Earlier, the development of Rule 60(b)(6) standards was consid-
ered through the same modes of analysis employed by the courts: the
"extraordinary circumstances" and "other reason" rationales. In pro-
posing solutions to problems arising under the rule, however, it is more
useful to discuss the cases according to their fact patterns. Based on
practice under the current rule, motions for relief from judgment can
be divided into four types. The first involves default judgments. The
other three involve nondefault judgments in which (1) the movant con-
sciously had chosen not to appeal, (2) attorney negligence prevented an
appeal or a timely Rule 60(b) motion, or (3) a clearly erroneous judg-
ment was entered. Each of these raises slightly different problems and
requires a somewhat different resolution of the truth-finality dilemma.
A discussion of each of these situations follows.
139. Dean Freedman has suggested that truth is only one of the values served in a trial
and, in some cases, may not be the most important interest promoted by the adversary sys-
tem. Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1060, 1063 (1975).
140. See Murphy, Justice and Judgment, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 565 (1974).
141. See Stalev, Fundamental Guarantees of Litigants in Civil Proceedings. A Survey of
the Laws of the European People's Democracies, in FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES OF THE
PARTIES IN CIVIL LITIGATION 355, 402 (1973).
142. Judge Frankel argues that "we are too much committed to contentiousness as a
good in itself and too little devoted to truth." He suggests that we should: "(I) modify (not
abandon) the adversary ideal, (2) make truth a paramount objective, and (3) impose upon
the contestants a duty to pursue that objective." Frankel, The Search for Trutlk" An
Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1052 (1975).
143. As one commentator notes: "Social observation reveals that in human interactions
persons and groups seek to achieve, within different forums, a wide range of values from
varied bases of power and by the utilization of different strategies. Given these realities,
'justice' can be made intelligible only through a systematic, objective consideration of these
social interactions. . . . By such a technique, one can discover a broad range of participants
in social conflict, ascertain the strategies being utilized to achieve their objectives, and iden-
tify the diverse values which they seek to realize." Murphy, Justice and Judgment, 23 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 565, 567 (1974).
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Default Judgments
The first problem involves a motion for relief from a default judg-
ment. Although there are no particular provisions in the rules regard-
ing these cases, 44 special factors argue for increased flexibility. Of the
reasons typically favoring finality, only the last one, the need to pro-
vide certainty for the opposing party, seems applicable. Because there
never was an adversary proceeding in which the issues were explored
fully, reopening the judgment to allow a trial might produce a different
result. Reopening should not be too burdensome to the system be-
cause this will allow the first, full trial in the courts. Moreover, due
process, unless reduced to a matter of pure form, suggests that the party
has litigated the issues. Admittedly, a theory of waiver might be in-
voked to override that concern. Waiver, however, is inappropriate
when the only reason justifying this detour from the pursuit of truth is
that certainty is lost by allowing the judgment to be reopened.145
On the other hand, certainty need not be totally sacrificed. A de-
fault judgment should not be reopened without some sense that the
trial will produce a different result. Further, because reopening a de-
fault judgment forces some duplicative actions on the court and the
opposing party, some method should be created to encourage defend-
ants to appear and to prevent abuse in order to protect the plaintiff
from undue harm or harassment. The overriding presumption, how-
ever, should favor relief because an active search for truth has yet to be
undertaken and, therefore, concerns for finality weigh less in the bal-
ance than they otherwise might.
Although many federal courts consider the above factors when ex-
ercising their broad equitable discretion to grant relief under Rule
60(b)(6), 146 a codification of those principles is needed. Of the seven
cases uncovered in which relief from a default judgment was denied,
five relied on interpretations of Rule 60(b) or the extraordinary-cir-
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(c) merely provides that a judgment may be set aside "in accord-
ance with Rule 60(b)." That rule, in turn, sets out no special reasons applicable to default.
145. A default should be distinguished from a judgment entered against the plaintiff for
failure to prosecute. In cases of failure to prosecute, although the issues also have not been
litigated fully, the need to enforce penalty dismissals suggests that waiver notions would
apply and no special relief provisions are necessary. See cases cited in note 44 supra.
146. See, ag., Bridoux v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Tozer v.
Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1951); Bell Tel. Laboratories, Inc. v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., 73 F.R.D. 16 (D. Del. 1976); Diversified Utils. Sales, Inc. v. Monte Fusco
Excavating Contracting Co., 71 F.R.D. 661 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Byron v. Bleakely Transp. Co.,
43 F.R.D. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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cumstances test without openly discussing these broader principles. 147
In the other two cases, relief was denied because it was not sought
within a reasonable time.148
Regardless of the correctness of these decisions, these courts failed
to address the special concerns present in a default, as opposed to a
nondefault, situation. Clarification is needed as to whether special or
additional factors should be considered in reopening a default judg-
ment. Indeed, because of the peculiar nature of the default problem, it
may be advisable to incorporate such provisions in Rule 55, the default
rule, rather than simply appending them to the already long and com-
plex Rule 60(b). One possible formulation might read as follows.
Rule 55(c) Setting Aside Default. For good cause shown the court
may set aside an entry of default. The court may set aside ajudgment
by default if itfinds that the movant has a meritorious defense, that the
motion was made within a reasonable time, and that undue prejudice
will not result to the opposingparty by granting the motion. The judg-
ment also may be set aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 14 9
This suggested amendment makes clear that increased flexibility or dis-
cretion is vested1 in the court, as well as what factors should be taken
into account in the exercise of that discretion. Those factors, in turn,
reflect an accommodation of the various policies discussed above. Pe-
titioners like Klapprott would no longer need to rely on the court's
careful construction of Rule 60(b) or on the ability of the court to find
extraordinary circumstances meriting relief.
The reference to Rule 60(b) might seem unnecessary, because
clause (6) is broader than the proposed formulation. This Article,
however, proposes restrictions on clause (6),150 which would make the
proposed Rule 55(c) the one conferring the broader discretion of the
two. The reference to Rule 60(b) is intended to clarify that clause (4),
pertaining to void judgments, can be used in place of Rule 55(c). In
that circumstance the balancing test suggested by Rule 55(c) is not
needed because the seriousness of the defect in the original judgment
predominates over all other factors. Also, in many instances in which
the motion is made within one year, it may be simpler to use the more
147. United States v. Erdoss, 440 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Horvath v.
United States, 404 U.S. 849 (1971); Caputo v. Globe Indem. Co., 41 F.R.D. 436 (E.D. Pa.
1967); United States v. $3,216.59 in United States Currency, 41 F.R.D. 433 (D.S.C. 1967);
Ruddies v. Auburn Spark Plug Co., 261 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Federal Enterprises,
Inc. v. Frank Allbritten Motors, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 109 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
148. Zurini v. United States, 189 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1951); United States v. Manos, 56
F.R.D. 655 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
149. Additions italicized.
150. See text accompanying note 176 infra.
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concrete criteria set out in Rule 60(b), and there is no reason to prohibit
this use.
Nondefault Judgments
Nondefault judgments present somewhat different concerns when
considering the truth-finality dilemma. There seems to be no problem
with allowing relief within one year of the judgment. By doing so,
finality is postponed for only one year, and the litigants thereby are
given one more opportunity to ensure a full adversarial exploration of
all the relevant facts. The question is whether there should be a more
flexible, less timebound, means of obtaining relief. When considering
the policies that any alternative should promote or protect, nondefault
judgments cannot all be treated alike. An examination of the types of
cases and issues that have occurred under current Rule 60(b)(6) sug-
gests, as noted above, that they fall into three categories: (1) a conscious
earlier choice by the movant not to appeal; (2) attorney negligence that
prevented an appeal or timely Rule 60(b) motion, and (3) entry of a
clearly erroneous judgment.
Party's effective choice
The easiest situations to analyze are those similar to Ackermann.
The party or the attorney has chosen not to seek review at an earlier
time and now attempts to seek relief from the judgment in order to
obtain that review. For purposes of the present discussion it does not
matter whether the original decision was made by the attorney or the
client 151 or whether it was made because of a mistake of law or fact.
The important point is that a conscious choice was made. Once that
finding is made, then relief should be denied, even in the infrequent
cases when it may be clear that the underlying judgment is erroneous.
The need to uphold finality when a conscious choice has been made is
most compelling.
Unlike the defaulting movant, the movant here has had a full and
fair opportunity to persuade the court as to what the truth is. A deci-
sion not to press the case in a more direct and immediate fashion con-
stitutes a waiver of the right to argue that the principle of finality must
defer to that of truth. Judicial economy will be served by upholding
the judgment, whereas a contrary conclusion might totally subvert it.
Not only is multiple and potentially duplicative litigation likely, but
also a general policy allowing such conduct might encourage careless
151. See text accompanying notes 152-58 infra.
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practices and result in a continual process of relitigation. This would
be especially unfair to the initial judgment winner, who would be un-
able to rely on the judgment. For these policy reasons, the system
should adhere to finality. There is no need, therefore, to broaden the
existing one-year grace period.
Attorney negligence
The next class of problems revealed by a study of the cases involv-
ing Rule 60(b)(6) is more difficult to handle. It involves situations in
which the failure to move earlier or to appeal was caused by the neglect
or mistake of the attorney. Many of these cases also would fall within
the preceding category in that a decision was made not to use other
existing avenues of relief. At this point, however, the focus is on the
attorney's conduct, and the question is whether the alleged innocence
of the client should alter our previous conclusion.
The Supreme Court set forth the general rule on attribution of at-
torney negligence in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co. 152 In that case, an
action was dismissed for failure to prosecute when the plaintiffs attor-
ney did not appear for a scheduled pretrial conference and offered no
reasonable excuse for his nonappearance. The Supreme Court af-
firmed, holding:
There is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of peti-
tioner's claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an
unjust penalty on the client. Petitioner voluntarily chose this attor-
ney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the
consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent.
Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of
representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the
acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have "notice of al facts,
notice of which can be charged upon the attorney."153
The Court then justified this conclusion by noting that the client's rem-
edy was a suit for malpractice and that to hold otherwise "would be
visiting the sins of plaintiffs lawyer upon the defendant.' 54
This compelling language might seem to answer the question
whether Rule 60(b) can relieve an innocent client from the attorney's
negligence. Although several courts have followed Link,155 a number
152. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
153. Id. at 633-34.
154. Id. at 634 n.10.
155. See, e.g., Universal Film Exchs., Inc. v. Lust, 479 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973); Kos-
tenbauder v. Secretary of HEW, 71 F.R.D. 449 (M.D. Pa. 1976); United States v. Manos, 56
F.R.D. 655 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Geigel v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 44 F.R.D. 1 (D.P.R. 1968).
In addition to the reasons given in Link, the district court in Kostenbauder v. Secretary
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of others have refused to adhere to that decision on motions for relief
from judgment by distinguishing' 56 or ignoring157 it on the assumption
that Rule 60(b) is one permissible way of relieving the client from the
errors of the attorney. The correctness of these decisions is not in issue
here. What is important is the concern they reflect about the innocent
client who has been harmed. Justice Black expressed this concern in
his dissenting opinion in Link:
The average individual called upon, perhaps for the first time in his
life, to select a lawyer to try a lawsuit may happen to choose the best
lawyer or he may happen to choose one of the worst. He has a right
to rely at least to some extent upon the fact that a lawyer has a li-
cense. From this he is also entitled to believe that the lawyer has the
ability to look out for his case and that he should leave the lawyer
free from constraint in doing so. Surely it cannot be said that there
was a duty resting upon Link, a layman plaintiff, to try to supervise
the daily professional services of the lawyer he had chosen to repre-
sent him. How could he know, even assuming that it is true, that his
lawyer was a careless man or that he would have an adverse effect
upon the trial judge by failing to appear when ordered? How could
he know or why should he be presumed to know that it was his duty
to see that the many steps a lawyer needs to take to bring his case to
trial had been taken by his lawyer? Why should a client be awak-
ened to his lawyer's incapacity for the first time by a sudden brutal
pronouncement of the court: "Your lawyer has failed to perform his
duty in prosecuting your case and we are therefore throwing you out
of court on your heels"? So far as this record shows, the plaintiff
never received one iota of information of any kind, character or type
that should have put him on notice as an ordinary layman that his
lawyer was not doing his duty.' 58
Although Justice Black's dissent challenges the entire notion that
the client should be burdened by the attorney's negligence, we need not
go so far. For present purposes, two kinds of cases should be distin-
guished. In the first, the client seeks relief alleging that an erroneous
judgment was entered because of the attorney's neglect or mistake. In
the second, the client alleges that a valid Rule 60(b) ground for relief
of HEW, 71 F.R.D. 449 (M.D. Pa. 1976), added the following: "[T]he prejudice to the Plain-
tiffs, although real and regrettable, is outweighed by the benefits which redound to other
litigants when the Court is able to prevent the propagation of unacceptable practices and,
inefficiencies and, thus, able to maintain a current docket." Id. at 453.
156. See, e.g., Bougbner v. Secretary of HEW, 572 F.2d 976 (3d Cir. 1978); United
States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1977); L.P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234
(D.C. Cir.), cer. denied, 379 U.S. 824 (1964), noted, 50 IowA L. REv. 641 (1965), 67 W. VA.
L. Rav. 173 (1965); King v. Mordowanec, 46 F.R.D. 474 (D.R.I. 1969). See also Ben Sager
Chems. Int'l, Inc. v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1977).
157. See, e.g., Radack v. Norwegian America Line Agency, Inc., 318 F.2d 538 (2d Cir.
1963). See also Carrethers v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 264 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Okla. 1967).
158. 370 U.S. at 647.
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exists but is now barred because of the attorney's failure to move within
the one-year limit. In the first situation, Link would apply. This re-
sult seems reasonable, particularly in light of the one-year grace period
for motions for relief from judgment. To hold otherwise would visit
an undue hardship on opposing parties, as virtually all losing parties
might claim incompetent counsel, and thereby forestall finality.
Rule 60(b), however, does represent a decision by the rulemakers
to allow some hardship to be imposed on the opposing party in the
interests of justice. Thus, the issue in cases of the second type is
whether to apply the remedy liberally, disregarding the general rule
imputing the lawyer's negligence to the client for purposes of ruling on
the merits of the motion for relief.
A discussion of this second situation must focus on two interre-
lated issues: (1) can a standard be developed that will sort out appropri-
ate cases warranting relief, and, if so, (2) what is the price of opening
judgments under these circumstances? It is clear, of course, that the
court should not sacrifice fmality simply on an allegation that attorney
negligence caused the failure to move in a timely fashion. The court
must inquire into whether the client knew or should have known of the
attorney's negligence. If so, then it seems perfectly just to adhere to
Link and deny relief. One such case involved a client who, after hir-
ing an attorney to file a lawsuit, made no attempt to discover what was
happening to the case over a five-year period of time. 59 Such a client
should not be allowed to make an untimely motion for relief from a
judgment dismissing the suit for failure to prosecute simply because the
lawyer's neglect caused both the dismissal and the failure to move for
relief earlier. In that situation, the individual's reliance on the attor-
ney was unreasonable. His own negligence should bring the case
within the same policies and balancing of equities applied when a con-
scious choice was made not to move in a more direct or timely fashion.
Equitable considerations demand that the opposing party not bear the
burden of the movant's negligence or mistake.
In most situations the question whether the client should have
known of the lawyer's negligence will require a more detailed investi-
gation. All of this, in turn, is time-consuming and burdensome both to
the judicial system and the opposing party, who will undoubtedly want
to contest that issue, unless the cost of contesting is greater than the cost
of settling. Thus, in an effort to be more fair to the allegedly innocent
or naive client, not only have the finality and certainty of the judgment
159. Stevens v. Stoumen, 32 F.R.D. 385 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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been violated, but also the need has been created for yet another pro-
ceeding to test the applicability of the above standard.
The seriousness of these two events should not be minimized.
With regard to the former, allowing relief contravenes not just the form
of finality, but virtually all of the systemic and equitable reasons favor-
ing finality over truth.1 60 Moreover, if even some of the charges of
incompetency currently leveled at the practicing bar are valid,1 61 this
exception would not be a minor one. Simultaneously, the creation of a
sifting mechanism for meritorious claims of attorney negligence also
presents the specter of potentially endless litigation, requiring a trial, a
Rule 60(b) hearing to determine if the client can be held at fault for the
untimeliness of the motion, and another hearing to determine the mer-
its of the motion. If these are successful, then there may be a new trial
and the attendant series of post trial motions. Faced with this possibil-
ity, one necessarily must return to the original question, this time per-
haps with more skepticism regarding the possibility of reaching a fair
solution. Indeed, given these difficulties, a strong argument could be
made that it is better simply to face the reality that the adversary sys-
tem often depends more on the skill of counsel rather than on "jus-
tice".1 62 Perhaps the harshness or potential inequity of that fact cannot
be mitigated through relief from judgment provisions.
This conclusion would be more acceptable if some effective rem-
edy existed for the innocent client. It is not sufficient merely to state
that the client chose the attorney and, therefore, has a responsibility to
be vigilant and to supervise the case. As Justice Black rightly ex-
pressed,1 63 those expectations simply are unrealistic in the vast majority
of cases.
The obvious answer to this dilemma is an action for malpractice
against the negligent attorney. A malpractice suit would provide some
compensation for the injured client, but would not disturb the finality
or certainty of the earlier judgment and, thus, would not place an un-
fair burden on the winning party in the first action. It is true that
reference to the client's remedy of malpractice is of small comfort ex-
160. See text accompanying notes 135-39 supra.
161. See, e.g., Burger, The Special Skills ofAdvocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certi-
fication ofAdvocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 227 (1973);
Burger Keeps Heat on Lawyers, 64 A.B.A.J. 25 (1978).
162. Compare Frankel, The Searchfor Trut'An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1031 (1975), with Freedman, Judge Frankel's Searchfor Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060
(1975).
163. See text accompanying note 158 supra.
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cept in the most extreme cases of negligence. 164 A case, however, in
which the client can demonstrate that but for the attorney's negligence
a timely relief motion would have been granted and the suit likely
would have been won clearly appears to fall within the general scope of
common-law malpractice.
Admittedly, this approach imposes additional costs and burdens
on the allegedly innocent client and on the judicial system that must try
the suit. Thus, as a further or additional remedy for less extreme cases
special rules should be developed to shift the costs to the negligent at-
torney under those Rule 60(b) cases. 165 More concrete criteria for as-
sessing this form of malpractice will reduce the burden on the judicial
system and the aggrieved party in prosecuting these claims. 166 In addi-
tion, neither the opposing party nor the client need suffer unduly.
A possible statutory formulation might be as follows:
When a party has failed to movefor relieffrom ajudgment within
the statutory period and there is a strong likelihood that the motion
would have been granted f it had been timely, the court may assess the
costs of the action against and deny fees to the attorney or it may order
the refund offeespaidpreviously !f itfinds that thefailure to move was
due to the lawyer's negligence and that the client was not contributorily
negligent.
Under this proposed standard, a type of malpractice per se is estab-
lished. This approach would necessitate some type of inquiry into
whether the party presented grounds that would have warranted relief
164. See generaly Huszagh & Malloy, Legal Malpractice: A Calculusfor Reform, 37
MoNT. L. REv. 279 (1976); Marks & Cathcart, Discvline Within The Legal Professiorn Is It
Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193; Wade, The Attorney's Liabilityfor Negligence, 12
VAND. L. REV. 755 (1959).
165. Courts shift costs or expenses to the attorney to sanction the improper conduct of
counsel. Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4), (b)(2), and (d), fees and expenses
may be charged against a lawyer who advises a client to ignore the legitimate discovery
requests of an opponent. Section 1927 of Title 28 allows the courts to impose all excess
costs on any attorney "who so multiplies the proceedings in any case as to increase costs
unreasonably and vexatiously .... " Professor Risinger argues that attorney cost sanctions
are a better way of handling dishonest pleading problems than penalizing a possibly inno-
cent client by striking the pleadings. Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement:
Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REv. 1
(1976).
166. The best remedy also would be one that would operate at the request of the client
alone because of the difficulty of finding an attorney willing to press a lawyer malpractice
suit. But see Stern, Malpractice Is a Lawyer's Problem, Too, 3 BARRISTER, Spring 1976, at
26, 44. Unfortunately, given the type of negligence involved-the failure to adhere to tim-
ing restrictions in rules for relief from judgments-it is most unlikely that the layperson
would be aware of the problem, much less the remedy. Thus, the remedy must depend on
other lawyers willing to act as watchdogs of the profession. For a solution to this dilemma,
see note 168 infra.
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from the judgment if it had been presented in a timely fashion, and
whether the failure to do so was caused by the neglect of the attorney.
Thus, the hearing under the proposed standard would impose some
burden on the judicial system. The court's inquiry, however, would be
vastly simplified. Unlike the Rule 60(b) situation, the judge need not
be concerned with possible prejudice to the opposing party. The hear-
ing would involve only the allegedly injured client and, as the opposing
party, his or her attorney from the original action. Further, the court
need not consider the impact of its decision on the general stability of
judgments, as the original judgment will not be affected. This solution
attempts to render justice, even though truth may not have been
reached in the main proceeding. Coupled with the availability of a
common-law malpractice action, it gives the innocent client two weap-
ons and, thereby, ameliorates the harsh impact of adhering to finality
through denial of motions for relief that are untimely because of attor-
ney negligence.
If enacted a statute such as the one proposed should be included as
part of Title 28 of the United States Code.167 That title already in-
cludes section 1927, a provision allowing the taxation of costs against
an attorney who has engaged in vexatious litigation. The alternative
of state legislation presents desirable possibilities, 68 but also suffers
from serious defects, not the least of which is the potentially haphazard
167. Other means of enacting a malpractice device suffer from various defects. Al-
though attaching the proposed procedure to Rule 60(b) might provide the greatest visibility,
the Rules Enabling Act may prevent that solution. See Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). There are some major differences between this proposal and other
costs provisions in the federal rules, see FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(E), 37(c), and 37(d), that
could merit its classification as substantive and outside the scope of the Enabling Act. The
decision to assess costs is remedial, and thus within the federal courts proper equitable
power. See generally Note, The Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine: Past and Present, 67
HARV. L. Rlv. 836 (1954). However, the decision to allow recovery for the negligent failure
to move in a timely fashion is one to create a remedy, not merely to decide which remedy
should apply.
168. State regulation might be superior if the state bar established a malpractice fund to
provide relief to clients in the position of those described in the text without the necessity of
engaging another lawyer or making more court appearances. That fund might be financed
by bar association dues or by imposing a small extra filing fee for all civil cases, thereby
spreading the cost among all persons using the legal system. This alternative is attractive
for several reasons. It would entail less expense to all concerned and would remove addi-
tional litigation from the judicial system. By spreading the cost, it recognizes that lawyers
are human and that the primary goal is to compensate the injured client. In cases involving
the gross negligence of an attorney, other remedies such as disbarment could be invoked.
The possibility of developing this method of relief necessarily must be considered as a gen-
eral solution to all types of legal malpractice, thus placing it beyond the scope of this
discussion.
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adoption of such a statute by the states. The penalties imposed on
attorneys for negligent practices under Rule 60(b) would vary depend-
ing on the state in which the federal court was sitting, not on whether
the attorney was practicing before a federal or state court. Insofar as
the penalties are meant to encouarge more careful attention by the at-
torney to federal rules of practice, scattered enforcement would under-
cut this goal and would be antithetical to the notion of a unified federal
judicial system.
Finally, there has been a growing trend in the federal courts to
more actively regulate the conduct of attorneys appearing before
them. 169 While controversial, 170 this movement reflects recognition on
the part of the courts that federal judges must exercise more control to
guard their own preserve from careless and unskilled lawyering. The
statute proposed here falls clearly within this category. This tie to dis-
tinct federal interests makes it proper for Congress to act.
The presence of these alternative ways of handling the attorney
negligence issue suggests that we need not compromise finality and its
benefits in order to achieve justice for the client. Thus, this class of
cases can be treated as any other in which judgment relief is sought. If
grounds for relief under Rule 60(b) are present and the motion is
timely, it may be granted in the interests of justice. If the motion is
untimely, relief may be denied in the interests of finality. Other means
are and could be available to shift the burdens or costs if the untimeli-
ness is the fault solely of the attorney.
The Direct Confrontation
The most difficult class of relief problems to resolve and the one
that results in the most direct confrontation between truth and finality
169. The first major sign of federal activity was a 1975 report by an advisory committee
to the Second Circuit recommending special admission requirements for advocates desiring
to practice before those federal courts. See Final Report of the Advisory Comm. on Proposed
Rulesfor Admission to Practice, 67 F.R.D. 159 (1975). In September 1975, Chief Justice
Burger appointed a 24 member committee of the United States Judicial Conference to con-
sider qualifications for practice in the federal district courts. See Devitt, Improving Federal
Trial Advocacy, 72 F.R.D. 471 (1977).
170. Compare Pedrick & Frank, Trial Incompetence: Questioning the Clare Cure, TRAL,
March 1976, at 47, with McLaughlin, Trial Incompetence- In Defense of the Clare Cure,
TRIAL, June 1976, at 62. See generally Burger, The Special Skills ofAdocacy.'Are Special-
ized Training and Certification ofAdvocates Essential to Our System ofJustice?, 42 FORDHAM
L. REv. 227 (1973); Frankel, he Searchfor Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1031, 1045-51 (1975); Weinstein, Proper and Improper Interactions Between Bench and Law
School Law Student Practice, Law Student Clerkships, and Rulesfor Admission to the Federal
Bar, 50 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 441 (1976).
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is that in which the judgment clearly is erroneous or unjust and all of
the preceding avenues of relief are unavailable. The rulemakers relied
on the equitable discretion of the courts, and for that purpose clause (6)
was included in the rule. However, the different timing restrictions
within the rule have caused some serious problems. Thus, the question
is how to treat those cases in which it is clear that truth was not reached
in the first proceeding, and yet avoid the pitfalls of the present scheme.
Should the one-year time limit be applied to all grounds under Rule
60(b), or should that restriction be abolished entirely, leaving the ques-
tion of timeliness in each case to the court's discretion?
One student commentator argues in favor of greater flexibility
"whereby courts refocus attention from the labels applied to grounds
for relief in Rule 60(b) to the factors inherent in particular fact situa-
tions that call for relief."' 171 He notes that the analogous experience in
cases of extrinsic fraud or in states having more discretionary relief
from judgments provisions indicates that the courts have been properly
protective of the goals of finality. 172 This Article has noted in consid-
erable detail that the courts have not abused their discretion when ap-
plying the existing equitable loophole of Rule 60(b)(6). 173
Unfortunately, however, the fact that finality may be properly pre-
served under a more discretionary procedure does not in itself answer
the question of which approach is better. Finality is only one aspect of
the problem. Almost equally important are the impacts or burdens a
discretionary approach places on the courts and the nonmovant. One
must consider whether those burdens are justifiable in light of the few
cases, in thirty years of practice under the rule, that have granted relief
beyond the one-year time period.
Abandonment of an explicit time limitation in all Rule 60(b) cases
would force the courts to become involved in much more complex deci-
sions. A good illustration is one proposed rule amendment that would
add the following equitable factors to be considered by the court.
[Tihe court may in its discretion determine that relief is justified at
any time, upon consideration of the following factors: (1) the extent
to which the party has received a full and fair trial of the issues; (2)
the degree of the party's own negligence or fault, his diligence in
seeking relief, the nature and quality of his claim or defense, and the
detriment to the party if relief is denied; (3) the degree of the other
party's fault or wrongdoing, and the nature and quality of his claim
171. Comment, Rude 60(b): Survey and Proposalfor General Reform, 60 CALIF. L. REv.
531, 539 (1972).
172. Id. at 568.
173. See text accompanying notes 42-133 supra.
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or defense; (4) a preference that decision be on the merits, but with
due regard to the rights of the other party and third persons and the
requirement that judgments be final; (5) the degree to which detri-
ment to the other party or to third persons may be reduced by impo-
sition of just terms on the party seeking relief, including posting of
bond to cover the other party's costs should the moving party fail to
show reasons justifying relief. Relief for fraud upon the court may
be allowed at any time, but the court shall consider the extent to
which the fraud impaired judicial impartiality, the extent to which
the fraud affects the public interest, and the extent to which rights of
third persons may be adversely affected if relief is granted. 174
Although the goal of focusing on the merits of the motion rather than a
label is laudatory, the price of such a complex approach would be ex-
tremely high, because this equitable standard is not limited to situa-
tions in which the judgment is clearly erroneous and neither the
movant nor the attorney is at fault for not seeking relief earlier. In all
cases the court must find that the reason for requesting relief is within
one of the six categories of the rule, and then make a detailed inquiry
into the underlying fairness of granting relief.
It is clear that this suggested approach favors truth over finality,
and places the burden of rebuttal on the party arguing for finality. In
most cases in which a motion for relief is made within a year, it seems
unlikely that the opposing party could demonstrate that delay would
cause prejudice sufficient to deny relief. This would be true even if the
movant was at fault in some way for the error below. Despite the like-
lihood that the party opposing the motion will not succeed, a totally
discretionary relief standard requires a detailed inquiry by the court,
affording the opposing party a full opportunity to persuade the court.
After full consideration, a one-year time limit seems more advan-
tageous than a fully discretionary standard. An explicit timing re-
straint balances the competing interests between truth and finality for
the courts and avoids both the necessity of a difficult and complex de-
termination and the potential inequity of inconsistent treatment of sim-
ilar issues by different courts. 175
The fact that a timing mechanism has some advantages does not
necessarily mean that no equitable exception to it should exist. Al-
though the form of the present Rule 60(b) has caused problems, this by
no means suggests that equitable concerns must be abandoned. One
possible approach would place the "other reason" clause within the
174. Comment, Rule 60(b): Survey and Proposalfor General Reform, 60 CALIF. L. REV.
531, 570 (1972).
175. The conflicting decisions under Rule 60(b)(6) are discussed at text accompanying
notes 93-103 supra.
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one-year time limit,176 but grant the court an extra measure of discre-
tion in all cases outside of that limit. The court could consider whether
relief might be proper in light of factors such as those listed in the pro-
posed amendment set out above. Appending discretionary factors to
the time-limit provisions, satisfies all equitable concerns and avoids the
confusion surrounding the existing rule.
This approach would place the finality decision ultimately in the
hands of the courts. The rule exists merely to help the courts decide
the easy cases and to leave the difficult ones to their discretion, giving
some guidance on what should be taken into account. Despite the at-
traction of a solution that mitigates the seemingly arbitrary or harsh
impact of time restrictions, the adoption of such a discretionary scheme
seems inappropriate and unnecessary, even for these cases.
We must remember that these equitable concerns are pertinent to
very few cases. As discussed, default judgments are treated separately;
when the party has made an effective choice not to pursue earlier ex-
isting alternative means of relief, the theory of waiver should preclude
relief; and when attorney negligence is involved, approaches other than
relief from the judgment best satisfy notions of justice for all con-
cerned. Thus, the court's discretionary power would provide relief pri-
marily in those situations in which some new evidence comes to light or
some change in circumstances, not discoverable earlier, indicates an in-
herent problem with the earlier proceeding.
Given this limited class of cases, the wisdom of creating a broad
discretionary reservoir of power in the court might properly be ques-
tioned. Even equitable considerations might well allow finality to tri-
umph in these cases. The rule already gives the parties an opportunity
to discover new evidence or the existence of fraud or mistake and to
obtain relief on that basis. To make every unfavorable judgment sub-
ject to a possible challenge on the ground that the testimony of some
new witness would result in a different outcome, or that some new evi-
dence would produce a different result, would place the court and the
176. The failure to include motions under clauses (4) and (5) within the one-year limit is
deliberate. Although arguments might be made that the same considerations favoring final-
ity also apply to these cases, the issues raised under these clauses merit different treatment.
Under Rule 60(b)(4), the judgment is alleged to be void. Such a serious defect would out-
weigh finality concerns. Similarly, clause (5), dealing with judgments that are no longer
valid because of changes in the law upon which they were based or because they have been
satisfied, also suggests a kind of defect outweighing normal finality concerns. Additionally,
neither of these provisions has caused the kinds of problems for the courts that have oc-
curred under clause (6). They are both very specific and therefore do not present the spec-
tre of never-ending litigation produced by the more vague and general equitable clause.
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parties on a seemingly endless treadmill of "what if' inquiries. Fur-
ther, because the ultimate decision in a trial may rest on a complex
interplay of factors, the potential for permutations and combinations
altering the result is immense. The presence of that spectre is not im-
portant because of the ultimate threat it poses to existing judgments.
Rather, its importance lies in the wasteful, time-consuming, and costly
procedure that results and the consequent sense of uncertainty that it
produces. Experience under present Rule 60(b) makes it clear that
lawyers will attempt to take advantage of any existing loophole, even if
the prognosis for success is slim. Present grants of discretionary power
under the rule have produced a procedure for challenge, but few judg-
ments have been altered substantively. Viewed from that perspective,
a proposal incorporating a grant of even broader discretionary power
seems to have little merit and many potential negative attributes. In
contrast, it does not seem at all unfair to deny relief beyond the one-
year time period.'77
What of the few cases in which other reasons warranting relief are
present? 78 A closer look at those cases leads to the conclusion that
they, too, do not justify the adoption of broad discretionary powers.
The same arguments made above can be applied to virtually all of
those cases. When the movant is alleging fraud, but not of the type
contemplated by clause (3),179 or failure to receive notice in time to
appeal 80 within thirty days of judgment, it seems reasonable to require
that the party discover those defects within a year of judgment. In the
situation in which Rule 60(b)(6) is invoked because implicit policy con-
siderations tied to the underlying statutory cause of action' 81 argue for
relief, there is no need to rely on the federal rules for a remedy. Alter-
ing an otherwise workable approach for the sake of such specialized
considerations allows the tail to wag the dog. If special treatment is
required, it can be accomplished through the statutes that create those
causes of action. Even the cases in which the movant seeks judgment
relief after a settlement has collapsed 82 may be handled through
means other than Rule 60(b)(6) when more than one year has passed.
177. Cases in which the court is unsure whether truth was reached in the preceding trial
also fall within this one-year limitation. If the court is not allowed discretion when it is
clear that the judgment is erroneous, then there can be no rationale supporting a broad
discretion under less compelling circumstances.
178. See text accompanying notes 104-109 supra.
179. See cases cited in notes 106-107 supra.
180. See cases cited in note 108 supra.
181. See cases cited in note 77 supra.
182. See cases cited in note 105 supra.
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One possible alternative is an action to enforce the judgment. In the
event that is not possible, clause (5) might be applied on the ground of
a change in circumstances, so that "it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application." Although that provi-
sion generally refers to injunction decrees, such an application would
be in keeping with its equitable purpose.
There may be other reasons that have not yet appeared before the
courts or that were not uncovered during the research for this Article.
Nonetheless, it seems highly likely that a thorough sampling of the
types of problems that will arise has been achieved. Further, even if
some compelling case demanding relief awaits revelation, a conclusion
favoring a general one-year time limit for all motions made under Rule
60(b)(1), (2), (3), and '(6) still seems warranted. 18 3 Even the most just
rule will produce harsh results at times. The social need for stability of
judgments outweighs those rare circumstances in which some individ-
ual injustice may result. An equitable treatment of the problem de-
mands a balancing of the needs of all interested parties, as well as those
of the judicial system itself. Such an approach, as just demonstrated,
favors broadening the current one-year time limit to include cases
under Rule 60(b)(6).
Conclusion
Existing practices under Rule 60(b)(6) both reveal problems and
suggest solutions. The reservoir of equitable discretion granted the
courts under that clause has not resulted in an abandonment of finality
and its benefits. Nonetheless, careful consideration of the difficulties
the courts face when applying the current rule reveals the need for
change. Confused by the structure of the rule itself, the courts have
developed and refined the extraordinary-circumstances test in order to
give some meaning to the clause without simultaneously allowing it to
swallow the other portions of the rule. This development has been
beset by interpretative difficulties and has bred uncertainty about the
scope of discretion granted under clause (6). Similar problems have
arisen with the alternative other-reason test of clause (6). This confu-
sion, in turn, seems to have encouraged litigation in the hope that relief
might be granted, and has in several instances manifested itself in con-
fused and conflicting decisions. Rule 60(b)(6) primarily appears to
183. As court administrative tasks become computerized, it might be possible for com-
puters to send notices to the parties and their attorneys automatically as the one-year period
draws to a close. This notice would reduce further the magnitude of possible unfair results,
as the number of instances of inadvertent failure to file a timely motion would be decreased.
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have produced unnecessarily prolonged litigation and new legal con-
tortions by clever attorneys. Far from assuring that truth is sought and
justice protected, this search for the ultimate right at the expense of
finality has perverted justice.
Fortunately, alternative relief procedures need not be devised in a
vacuum. A close analysis of the case law under the present discretion-
ary provisions provides a sense of what may be needed. There are
essentially four types of situations that must be considered in order to
decide whether to opt for a broader discretionary provision favoring
truth or a more timebound solution supporting finality. They are: de-
fault judgments; the deliberate choice not to seek relief earlier; failure
to move for relief in a timely manner due to attorney negligence; and
clearly-erroneous judgments. An examination of each of these areas
and the competing concerns they present suggests that a solution favor-
ing finality is the more equitable one. The problems of default judg-
ments and attorney negligence can be solved through methods other
than Rule 60(b), thereby providing relief without confusing the appli-
cation of that rule. When the party has made an effective choice, the
concept of waiver should prevent him from disturbing finality. The
fourth situation places truth and finality in direct confrontation. How-
ever, an evaluation of the possible impact of a rule favoring a discre-
tionary case-by-case treatment of this problem suggests that the few
benefits that might be obtained are far outweighed by the burdens of
that solution on the parties and the judicial system as a whole. Given
that conclusion, a timebound relief from judgments rule seems most
appropriate because it allows some leeway for litigants in this last kind
of case, but avoids the potentially horrendous burden broader discre-
tion would produce.
In keeping with the above analysis, three recommendations are in
order, with the caveat that they comprise a total scheme and would be
fully effective only if adopted entirely. First, Rule 55(c) should be
amended to provide special criteria for allowing relief when there never
has been an adversarial determination of the merits.184 Second, the
Congress should adopt a statute permitting the courts, after making
certain findings, to shift costs, and to deny or refund fees, against attor-
neys whose negligence has prevented their clients from obtaining relief
under Rule 60(b). 185 Third, and finally, Rule 60(b) should be amended
to limit motions under clause (6) to the one-year period applicable to
184. The proposed amendment is set out in text accompanying note 149 supra.
185. A proposed statute is set out at text following note 166 supra.
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other clauses of the rule. If these recommendations are followed, a
great deal of the uncertainty and needless litigation that has occurred
under the current rule will be eradicated.

